\
=12opportunities for world dominance would be breath-taking.
Hence we come to the
paradox that the further we go by international agreement in the direction of
eliminating bombs and installations, the stronger becomes the temptation to
evade the agreement}
The feeling of security which one imagines would come from
a bombless world would seem to be a fleeting one,
This suggests that the basic problem is somewhat different from that of
just getting rid of bombs,
It is rather a question of how to reduce to the lowest
possible minimum the potential advantages to be gained by a successful evasion
of a limitation agreement,
If the threat to security comes from the prize that
is available to a violator of a treaty, then the sensible thing to co would be
to take away the value of the prize.
Obviously this would not be an easy thing
aN
‘mgst
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adventures in atomic warfare that could be devised,
bad
ny
It happens that the atomic bomb is one of th
adaped to the technique of retaliation,
ke,
vo. e~
is atomic energy itself,
poe
to do, but one has at hand a new and powerful aid for accomplishing it and that
persuasive deterrents to
It is peculiarly well
One must assume that, so long as bombs
exist at all, the states possessing them will hold themselves in readiness at all
times for instant retaliation on the fullest possible scale in the event of an
atomic attack,
The result would be that any potential violator of a limitation
agreement would have the terrifying contemplation that not only would he lose
his cities immediately on starting an attack, but that his transportation and
communication systems would doubtless be gone and his industrial capacity for
producing the materials of war would be ruined,
-If in spite of all this he
still succeeded in winning the war, he would find that he had conquered nothing
but a blackened ruin,
The prize for his violation of his agreement would be
ashes!
Hence there does seem to be available a safeguard strong enough to act as
a real deterrent against possible cvasion of a limitation agreement,
But it is
/é