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APPENDIX"D"
IMPACT ON JOINT TASK FORCE
1. A factor of major importance in considering the
feasibility of moving all or part of PILGRIM to EPG is the
effect of such a decision on JTF-7 and the DOD.
Because of the
long lead times inherent in JTF-~-7 planning for an operation at
EPG and obtaining the required logistic support they could not
be ready to support such an operation in less than 14 months
from the time the decision was made.
JTF-7 is now in an
interim period phase and is planning now for HARDTACK on the
basis of the start of the operational period in April 1958 and
the first detonation approximately May 1, 1958.
2. If it is desired to mount an operation at EPG in the
late Fall 1957, JTF-7 would immediately be faced with the pro-
blem of competing with other DOD scheduied programs for men,
money,
ships, planes,
transportation,
supplies and other equip-
ment.
Consequently, we must assume, and it must be realized
that this assumption is the only basis on which the operation
would be feasible within the time scale in our present thinking,
that DOD would fully support it with the highest priorities so
that competing DOD programs would yield.
On this basis JTF-7
could be ready by October 1957 if the decision were made now,
3. During the proposed operational period the weather is
characterized as a typhoon period.
The everpresent threat of
typhoons may force a complete shutdown of operations and
evacuation of the atolls.
Even typhoon alerts will disrupt
operation because of the necessity to take precautionary measures,
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Appendix "p"
TPP