EePCE2 OrMOR SECREY i tad epi We The Attorney General favored splitting the Council action, es recommended by the Treasury (one action to deal with the general port security program and the second action to deal specifically with the matter of proposing legislation to deal with problems grow- ing out of the Parker v. Lester decision). The Acting Secretary of State said his Department was very concerned about the problems occasioned by the Parker v. Lester decision, and it was the hope of that Department that the Administration would draft and submit legislation on the subject to the Congress. It was the Department's thought that if corrective action is not taken by the Congress, it should be made clear that the Legislative and not the Executive Branch is responsible for the situation which obtains. The Attorney General agreed with the Acting Secretary of ’ State, provided legislation along the lines indicated is determined - to be constitutionally possible. The Attorney General said this matter would be considered when efforts are made to draft such legislation. He said that he would personally try to get across the point that resolution of the problem described in detail by General Cutler rests with the Congress or the courts, and not with the Executive Branch. General Cutler next commented on paragraph 14 of NSC 5802, dealing with selected internal security measures, including the development and use of detection devices, to meet the threat of clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons into the United States. He stated that the policy guidance in this paragraph is consistent with the revisions of our Basic National Security Policy and with the President's assignment, in 1953, to the NSC's Internal Security Conmmittees of responsibility for coordinating the development of countermeasures to detect and defend against the clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons into the United States. He stated that in the course of the Planning Board's discussion of this matter, the following operational facts were brought out: "(1) The existing devices used to detect clandestine "(2) (a) introduction of nuclear weapons are not discriminating and require improvement to be able to identify fissionable from other radioactive material. — In 1956, at conferences between Treasury, Justice, and the NSC Internal Security Committees, the Committees accepted--as a limited start towards what they considered a necessary total countermeasures progrem against clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons--a Treasury proposal under which Treasury would procure and put into use 125 detection devices for Coast Guard and 90 devices for Customs. ' co 7 nop ee ARa eae uf s ‘