bon ie go tm bs ““s” “TOP “SECRET of any program which had been included in NSC 5408 does not of it~ self cancel or change that program. Under paragraph 1-b each responsible agency is required to determine whether a specific pro- gram is currently valid under NSC 5802 or should be cancelled or changed. General Cutler indicated that, following the introductory and general policy statements appearing in paragraphs 1 through 5 of NSC 5802, the statement covers strategic and tactical warning (paragraphs 6 and 7), military policies (paragraphs 8 through 12), internal security and port security policies (paragraphs 13 through 19), and other non-military policies (paragraphs 20 through 27). General Cutler then invited attention to paragraph 4 of the state- ment, which outlines the time-phasing and urgency of the new Conti- nental Defense policy proposed in NSC 5802, which time-phasing takes into account the recent National Intelligence Estimate on "The 5o- ‘viet ICBM Program". novel General Cutler mentioned that the compilation of this draft policy statement involved great difficulties and complications with a few resulting divergencies of view as reflected in the paper. He then proceeded to take up each of these divergencies. After reading paragraph 8 of the draft statement, General Cutler indicated that the Science and Technology Observer at the Planning Board, with the concurrence of the State, ODM and FCDA Planning Board representatives, recommended that there be included in paragraph 8 a requirement for a high percentage kill capability against enemy aircraft or missiles approaching or operating over the North American Continent before they reach vital targets. Dr. Killian said this point had been suggested for inclusion in the policy paper in order to raise for Council consideration the question as to whether the programs envisaged in NSC 5802 would actually achieve the objective called for in paragraph 3 of NSC 5802 ~--namely, that the United States be prepared at all times to counter an attack on the North American Continent in such a way as to deter Soviet attack, or, if an attack occurs, to insure our survival as a free nation. He said that from a technical standpoint, the air defense system we presently have and the one we have programmed will probably not achieve the aforementioned objective, and that it will probably give us a kill capability of less than 50%. It was the view of the technological experts who examined this matter that our defenses against aircraft and missiles should have a greater capacity if we are to meet the objective referred to above. It was Dr. Killian‘ts thought that the Council should be cognizant of this technological judgment before taking final action on NSC 5802. Secretary McElroy thought Dr. Killian's point was a valid one and, indeed, a key one. He said, however, that the Defense Department questioned whether it would be desirable to include in a 1 Fe “ de ey: tm #4 WE THE. = . me a ae . angeNE wae a . A 4 at a : Gn a Ce - | ; \ ; ee . te : cr Some ys om : et e “ Pe A e fp ORE ve . oe hee TO P ‘SECRE T