sSLSEnnOwers UNCLASSIFIED rapers, 1753-01 ' baat cheat Yea ds Moshall alle (Ann Whitman file) Po implementation to the Secretary of State and the al Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, aaypane with of Rete v hee ~ ned ae Ve wa sigh tet > tes pe the Operations Coordinating Board in ord r to ensure that proposed actions in the field resul’ , in maximum psychological advantages to the United S rates. 4. U.S. OBJECTIVES AND COURSES OF ACTION IN KOREA (NSC 5514; NSC 170/1; NSC Action No. 1340; Memo for C from Ex- ecutive Secretary, same subject, dated March 7, 1955) Mr. Cutler briefed the Council on the contents ¢ if the re- | vised policy paper on Korea (copy of briefing notes filed in the Minutes of the meeting). oF Cork he the fer The President interrupted Mr. Cutler's briefing with a comment that he would very mich like to have General Taylor « r General Hull report to the National Security Council on the relat’ ve military situation of the UN Command in Korea and the Communists ir | the north, esident added when General Taylor returned to the United States. The that in view of the dangers posed for the UN Command by t e constant Communist violations of the armistice agreement, and in v ew of the ssion, he aifficulties involving the Neutral Nations Supervisory Co regretfully believed that the United States would have to start violating the armistice itself. After Mr. Cutler had completed his briefing of Ihe Council with a reference to the acute difficulties encountered in the effort to prepare a Financial Appendix, he called on Admiral Ra Admiral Radford explained that he was quite cer ~ 7% unless there were major changes in the military situation and the Communists withdrew large forces, it would be abs possible to get the Government of the Republic of Korea agree to reduce the current level of South Korean military Accordingly, Admiral Radford predicted that we would have to continue to support the existing level of South Korean forces for a t least an- -- vaed —— - av . sd fom... . ‘ woe: °F As te Aiea oe other year. Mr. Cutler then asked the Secretary of State if he would not comment on the problem posed by the NNSC. Secretary I ulles indicated that the State Department had found it very hard t OD get the Swiss and Swedish Governments to do anything at all to rem edy this situation lest in so doing they give offense to the Soviet Union. Accordingly, the most the United States could hope to do fpr the skeleton time being was to reduce the size of the NNSC at once to or nominal basis. The Communists, of course, did not wan any change them. in the existing set-up, because it was a one-way street f They entirely restricted the operation of the teams in No h Korea, while enjoying advantages from the relatively unrestricte operation a cr) DECLASSIFIEDy~y’, hay - 10 - |