he ¥ TOP SECRET . . i e Mero Va ib : » PP f eB. : The President said he had one comment to make on all this discussion--namely, that we were not going to carry out all these plans and still maintain a free economy in the United States. At this point General Cutler asked Secretary McElroy when he estimated that the over-all review of the U. S. missiles program would be completed. Would it be by April 1? Secretary McElroy ~~ plied that the President would have made a decision on @ number o .moot points by April 1, but not on all. General Cutler then called on Secretary Quarles for the fourth in the series of Defense Department reports--namely, on whether to harden SAC bases. Secretary Quarles made his report, and noted that the review of this matter in the Defense Department had confirmed the earlier position of the Defense Department that it did not concur in the recommendation of the Gaither Panel relative to providing blast shelter at SAC bases. (A copy of Secretary Quarles' report is filed in the minutes of the meeting.) Asked by General Cutler to comment, Dr. Killian expressed the opinion that Secretary Quarles' reasoning against hardening SAC bases appeared persuasive, though Dr. Killian hoped that this opinion would not be interpreted to exclude the possibility of a limited and selected hardening of SAC bases as opposed to a total hardening progrem for SAC bases. Secretary Quarles replied that the possibility of a special and limited hardening of selected SAC bases could very well be kept in the picture. Dr. Killian then added that he had a question toput to fe eee eee ee ee eee rete Boe ee nee ne eretary Quaries. | Poneman wena a enne anses ee ee ee be ewww ene meee ween esa ne ce ee ee CBC RR OR eee ee ee eee ee ee ee Wen naneeanscreaecavcran toeneens eee en enoe CEE AR Ree meee ew ee ehTOR ee ar mere eee ee ee ete eee ee eee twee ee eee eta ses een aeve Ste eee ee meres eenue ena ema e een wee tate e ene mete enc ete el lg ee ee a ee cee eee eee eee ee ee eeee ee et ee Ce ee Hae eeserene i ar Vara TTT TE te ree eee rennet nee n een ete eee Pee CETTE LTTE Rt eee rte eee ee eee eee e ene eiee rece cceen cee iti \ eet het enema eee we wee eta e eee ee enenen cane a [ee re E ETE ESE ete a nr a a e ces cence tanto eine tenes ett i a a ee eae eee ee pet tte a ee en reves I See LETTE EEE De ee cen eee eee ew eee e wre ee ee le mene ne Peet te eee ee eect etme eee et eweeee eee ETT. i a nr rece eee sets lat eee IETS e eee ween w cee e cece cece niece whee ee ee TILED LLIVE Dett eee tes e eee ee reece ec ce tee e be nc er eee erste ee twa wn sane ee a ea ee em ewe eee ew twee e eee etc e cence lens b *meeeae sume ewaeseeves ih ee ee ee oe ee ee eee i ce ee mee tame reer ee ee ew eh ncancnn ee he areeee Heme CORR ee te ete ee te em ew tw e Cee eee meee ee eee eteeee i ee wee ete twee enee nae sew ane een nme nene eonsa erneean i ee re Sere eee eee eta wes Se eR ee a tee ew eae ee eee eh ee mee eee See ew ete eee tee et tet ee eee eae eet eae ease neaene ee aeeas Se eee eee ee eee ina ee eo a thet ee a ee ee eee eee eee eet i ee et th th ‘ eeesae Ce eee mame em Sess e eee eae teh eee ae ‘ i ee ee hee tee tees eee reene ee a a rr a SO ee eee eetene Ce mw ee eee eee mee eee te tees see eee eee ee ee ee a * * sew eae eee tree see tse eee eaten SR RHR ee eet eh eee ee ee eee weave ae Ce ee teen eee ee eee a ene tees ceeaneee sete een wastes se eanae ba eee ewe east ee neae Tn ree me [ee eaene ee a cao _ cern ct rene The Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization stated his agreement with the views of the Department of Defense that it was not wise to adopt now a program of hardening all SAC bases; but f ms 1 i i -u- Oe SESH EER “TOP SECRET