that positdom at approximatd1y A plis 3 hours 1f tho situation pore mitted. The Flagship of CTG 7,3 (CURTISS) would initially be on true pearing 120°, 25 MM all frou GZ, thes nove south approximately 15 NM after-Hpiuw 10 midutes (i.c., after completion of Raydist requires ~~ nentee)_ ad other shipe excopt tho destroyors would move south with tha CURTISS post~-alot, and miintain shot-tine spacing and dispositions s+ relative to her, The Control DDE would bo at 240° True at 90 NM all fron GZ. Ab 6 April a directive wos issued to rus NYKOPO Flight ble on’KOON day, the survey aircraft to takaeoff approximately 071500M, by-pass Bikini, avoid contaminated arcas, mako in-flight reports of data and to continue the ible pattern at least to Taka if practicable. At approximately H minus 6 hours, the British Unit on Kwjaloin was advised of tho forecast 72-hour air particle trajectorics and tho forecast GZ HeHour winds, authority was included for the British Unit to penetrate the Danger urca in acccrdsnce with scranble and routing instructions to be issued by CTG 7.4 posteahot. By a previcus advisory continued for 7 «4 , the British Unit had been directed to fila flight plana through the Kwajalein Liaison Officer using the task force advisory as authority for KOON flights. A final, woathor radsafo check wes made at O430M with no sicnificant change made in the criginal forecast. The final observed GZ wind check at approximately 0530M was favorable; however, at shottime there waa a large rain shower between the fleet and GZ, possibly extending to Gz it- self. Cloud cover extended up to 40,000 feet, with a broken base at 2,000 feet. Transient shipping contacts being favorable, KOON was de=~ tonated on the surface of the western tip of Eninman Island at 070620M__ april 1954 without undue incident to the embarked task force personnel and shipa. Post-shot adviscorics were issued prior to H plus 30 ninutes to the Chairman AEC, C/S army and CLICPACFLT as on past shots, indicating time of detonation and a general statonent of safety of porsommel. Due te the low yleld of the task force fleet to the scuth was canecclled at 0630M. Based on a prelirinary damage and radsafe survey made by helicopter at approxinately H plus 2 hours, all units of the task force were issued an advisory directivo as follows: SUG.R through OBOE and NiN not appre~ ciably contaminated; Rehour expected to be O7LLOOM; CTG 7.3 have task force vessels stand off the lagoon cntrance at LOOOM pending the oute come of the lagoon water survey of tho TRE and NN anchorages; upon confirmation of Rehour, all units re-cntor N..N anchorages in accordance with previous instructions. During tho carly morning hours the two cloud trackers (Wilson 2 and ‘Alson 3)made no contact with the cloud except one reading by ‘Hil- son 3 of 15 or/hr west of Bikini, Following the holding pattern scarch “Wilson 2 advanced at H plus 5 hours to its upwind sector, ‘/ilson 3 was directed at 1220h to scarch a 30° sector centered on 45° True fron GZ to maximum range at 9,000 fccet. M-=3 .