ineluded former Uninetok-Bilcind Dangor Ares) was withia the scaret. (loss upes to maintain @ eleae sestor, whereses the searen of Ares GHEE wae sush thas it boeamea gesentially a check of com lianse with the Danger Area notice and couldybe initiated late enough in the pre-shot eshedule of events ta avoid ast of the dalays if the forecast winds did not materialise. On 19 laren, dus to the transient. shipping incidents arising froma BRAW), CINCPACFLT iseued instructions te all military sguneies opersting in the Pacifie to the effect that, until further notice, ali Pacific Fleet vessels except those sssigned te JTF SEVEN, entering a circular ares within 450 MI from @ point 12H, 144would ensure thewaring of casualty file badges and/ or phosphor glass dosimeters by 5% of the persennel, aboard until sel departod from the area. The directive further contained r that the instructions ap,.ly to MSTS shipe as practicable. atv about the same tins, an interchange of advisery dispatches and recos= mendations took place between the Task Force and CINGPACFLT culminating in &@ re~statement of Task Force policy relative to eleeure of airways. The pre-BRaVO Task Force Radsafe plan conteaplated elosure of sirways caly when actually required and saintenanse of the closed status only until the dangor subsequent to each shot had paseed. arrangements had been ande by CING— PACFLT with those in charge of military airweys and the Regional Adsinistrator of the CAA to cffcet temporery and prompt closure of air routes when . the need arose. No change was aade in the beesia plan is stated above. Also, during the interval following 3R.W, 1 change was ande in the method of computing tha air RADEX. Prior to this time (including Operation IVY), the classical method of com.utation 2e outlined in air Weather Service Manual 105-33 had bcen used. « oasic assumption of this acthod le that the source of radiation consists essentially of a point-source in all directions except the vertical. Surface RADEX computations prior to BRAY had taken the point-source factor inte account (using a circular source of 15 NM red- ius, later revised upward based on BRAVO to about 29 NH); a similar modifisation in the air RADEX computation was devised and applied te all future forecasts, with complutely satisfactory results. Further postponements and re~scheduling of the ROM:O shct resulted in progressive dsily woather/radsafe checks. At noon on 2) March, the synop= tic weather situation was again such is to place some hope on the 22nd being a shot day. «A suries of Command Sriefings and pre-shot advosories ws again completed on 2] idarch and continued until about 190QM, at which tine it became apparsnt the hoped-for winds were not mterialising. The shot was postponed indefinitely, ond the Task Force placed on an l&-hour capa- bility. In accordance with: radsafs surveys and Lagoon water sampling, and in the interest of morale of the Bikini personnel, swiaming was permitted (since 14 March) at the southwestern beaches. .