ROMGIEIEbased-cr the fact that no intonsity readings were available. ota tyan the "100 plus® of the provious day, and on the fact that the E weather station's off-secale roading had been compared senerally with readings in the task force fleet cleser to GZ and with the readings iz the TG 7.4 weather detachnentsupplies, although sush instrunente bad been recommended by the Taske Force iadsafe. recommendation to supply .CNGELIX to all weathor island detachnonbe were essentially sealed agzinst acisture in any fom. Since no previous test cxpertense indicated high fall-cut. intensitios et islands at similar distances, and sinse to equip with other typee of instrumonte would haw ontailed problens in humid storage and } f : E naintenance of electronic equipment under conditions of weekly emercuney~ type roesupply, the decision had :oen made not te include additional instranente for the weather stations, (I¢ is alse noted that the three ing peracnnel of Troject 6.6 placed umdor the weather detachment, had also directed by Trocram 6 rersannel. to include an i8/PR No such instruments were included:) In the decision to authorize the NCONGEUIE evacuation, consideration wea given to the fact that only U.S. troops were being removed whereas native populated atolls were elso undoubtedly contaminated to the same or hizhor degree. The informal deciaion to romove only UOMGERIE personnel was made on the basia of urgoncy and incontrovertible nesessity and because it ws the only atoll on which there wes positive evidence of the exact ground contamination. It wos decided that the inference of similar con- tamination on other atolls in the vicinity should be considcred by the Tasic Force Cocmander, ctordingly, the Task PoreeRadsafe Officer, in conferene with the Task Foree end Task Group Comanders,ond the Selentific Director, presented the falleout situation as it was know at that tine (approxte mataly 1330M, 2 March). The twenty thousand foot forecast trajectory (modified post-shot) was believed to be the primary factor in the novenent of contemination south of the prodicted fall-out area. It was assumed that a considerable number of adjacent populated atolls in a ceneral “"horse-shoe” shape were cffected, The commancers wore advised that the NYKOFO Flivht »BLE had Seon requosted the previcus ni-ht and that this flicht had been instructed to make an in-flicht report upon reaching T..ONGI Before the conference wes over, 2n in-fliht report from Flicht .SLE indicated 1350 mr/hr at 1340M, 2 March on the ground at iionzelap Island, 400 mr/hr at 1328M at AILINGINAE and 1.0 mr/he at 1300M for WOTHO. ‘The decision was reached at the conference that an evacuation of NONGILAP was necessary and that others likely to be involved, would be determined or the basis of readincs from the remvining portion of the Flicht «BLE pattern ~ore X-8