I Nee NF BF Ba dene le” ew we Ne dh et a le ed we heat pe ee ce Ne fet ae ed eh a ee ee aNd Ft ab Nb hy PENSACOLA and SALT LAKE CITY, are examined for the personnel activities associated with post-BAKER reboarding. Additionally, the dose due to internal emitters is assessed for personnel who unloaded ammunition from twenty target ships at Kwajalein, and for shipyard workers exposed to eight of the higher intensity ships at Pearl Harbor, Puget Sound, and San Francisco Naval Shipyards. For almost all activities, fifty-year bone dose commitments are less than 0.15 rem from any annual period of exposure. Major Descriptors: *CROSSROADS PROJECT -- UNDERWATER EXPLOSIONS; *PERSONNEL -- RADIATION DOSES; *SHIPS -- CONTAMINATION; *UNDERWATER EXPLOSIONS -BIOLOGICAL RADIATION EFFECTS Descriptors: INHALATION Broader Terms: BIOLOGICAL EFFECTS; EXPLOSIONS; RADIATION EFFECTS DOSES; EXPLOSIONS; Subject Categories: 450200* -- Military Technology, Defense -- Nuclear Explosions & Explosives 10/5/566 01836075 (Item 266 from file: INTAKE; NUCLEAR Weaponry, & National 103) ERA211-051890; EDB-86-159957 Author(s): Oleson, M.H. Title: Detection of fireball light at distances Corporate Source: - Air Force Technical Applications Center, FL (USA) Publication Date: 29 Aug 1958 p 19 Report Number(s): AD-363644/6/XAB Note: Report on Operation Ivy Project 7.6 Document Type: Report Language: English Journal Announcement: EDB8&608 Patrick AFB, (U) Avallability: NTIS, PC A02/MF AOl. Subfile: FRA (Energy Research Abstracts). GRA (NTIS NTS) Country of Origin: United States Country of Publication: United States Abstract: Attempts were made to detect at long distances the light emitted from the Ivy detonations. Two locations, Johnston Island (3,100 km) and Kwajalein Island (620 km), were chosen. At Kwajalein, in addition to a ground installation, equipment was also mounted in a plane flying above the cloud cover. Measurements were made with red- and blue-sensitive photocells. Out of a possible total of six records, only one positive detection was made and this was from the equipment in the plane on the occasion of King shot. The remaining cases are accounted for as follows: Three cases were timing-notification uncertainties which make it impossible to state that the equipment was operating at detonation time; one case where it is known that the equipment was operating at the right time, but there is no record of the light signal. It is concluded that light from a nuclear detonation can be detected to a distance of about 600 km under favorable conditions. Any further work should emphasize a basic study of the phenomena involved in the transmission of light beyond the horizon. Major Descriptors: *IVY PROJECT; *NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS Descriptors: ABSORPTION; ATTENUATION; DETECTION Broader Terms: EXPLOSIONS; NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS Subject Categories: 450200* -- Military Technology, Defense -- Nuclear Explosions & Explosives 10/5/567 01821977 Author(s): Title: -- LIGHT TRANSMISSION Weaponry, & National (Item 267 from file: 103) EDB-86-145853 Parker, H.M. Fallout comparisons Corporate Source: General Electric Co., Atomic Profucts Operation Publication Date: Report Number(s): Order Number: 10 Nov 1954 HW-33754 DE86013645 9083024 p 5 Richland, WA (USA). Hanford