' , 2 7 PON Yh} 15} ene ow mow re oo cee” 1 t This subject was followed by comments on the status of the Air Defense System in FY 1959 and this in turn by & chart indicating the forthcoming FY 1959 deployments of the three military services in the Pacific-Far East area. It was pointed cut that under the proposed budget it would be necessary to withdraw one U.S. division from Korea. This would be offset to some degree at least by an increase of two missile commands. The totel reduction in personnel deployed in this area would amount to 51,000 by June 30, 1959. As for the deployment of naval forces there would have to be a reduction in the number of aircraft carriers and a reduction in our submarine capabilities in the Pacific. It was hoped that these reductions might be offset through the maintenance of combat-ready naval forces in the Central and South Pacific. With respect to the Air Force, there would be six wings in the area cn June 30, 1959, a marked reduction from the levels of FY 1957. On the other hand, the strength of the Air Force wings would be enhanced by increased nuclear capabilities. Chart 7 indicated the character of the deployment of U.S. military forces in the Europe-Middle East area which it was pointed out was the most critical area. Colonel Nigro and Captain O'Grady pointed out that the Army now had 5 divisions in Western Europe. The proposed FY 1959 program would require the withdrawal of two battle groups from this force. The result would be an overall de- crease in U.S. Army forces in this area by approximately 18,500 men. Navy capabilities would likewise bave to be reduced in the area and there would be significant decreases in the Air Force. Some 17 squadrons would have to be pulled out of the area. Inasmuch as these reductions related to the NATO commitment, the next chart indicated current U.S. NATO commitments. omee - ‘ ua! The concluding subject and chart consisted of observations on the three most critical problems confronting those who had drawn up the military program for FY 1959. These were the problems of modernization, deployment and firepower. The general conclusion was a clear statement of the decrease in U.S. military capabilities in FY 1959 as compared to these capabilities in FY 1957. General Twining felt that this was a serious matter which required the most careful study. REPRODUCED AT THE DWIGHT, D. EISERHOWER LIBRARY ~ me . "7 _ TOP SECRET At the conclusion of this portion of the presentation, the President said that he had thought it rather curious that while there was & proposed reduction in the total number of Air Force wings, the program nevertheless proposed an increase in the number of tanker aircraft squadrons. Colonel Nigro explained to the President that as B-52's gradually replaced B-36's, it was necessary to have additional jet tankers which accounted for the increase in the tanker Bquadrons.