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of intelligence which had become available in the last 24 hours were
set forth in the shortest possible form. For those who had time to
read them, these short items were followed by more detailed exposition. It was also proposed in the future to give greater emphasis
to scientific developments in the Sino-Soviet bloc countries.
The President expressed himself es favorably inclined to
the new format, and also suggested increased use of maps, which the
President said he found helpful. The President added that if men as
busy as the heads of the Executive departments and agencies got too
much in the way of intelligence briefs, they would have to spend
most of their day reading and digesting them. He therefore believed
that Mr. Dulles' proposal of a page or two of significant items, with
a follow-up farthose who had time to read it, was a good idea. The
President added that he wished to receive no intelligence reports of
this nature except through the Director of Central Intelligence or
under his coordination. Normally, said the President, this met his
requirements.
Mr. Dalles solicited suggestions and edvice on his propesal
from the members of the Council.
Mr. Dulles then suggested that he had another propesal to
lay before the Council. He pointed cut that in the course of the ~~
Lyndon Johnson Committee hearings, he had been constantly pressed to
make estimates of the comperative position and capabilities of the
United States and of the USSR in varicus areas and fields as, for exemple, in that of tallistic missiles. Mr. Dulles said that he had
invariably refused to be drawn into such comparisons because, by law,
he was the spokesman cnly for the situation in fcreign areas. He
could not let himself be placed in the position of being the spckesman for U. S. military capabilities and, indeed, he was not competent
to state these capabilities. Nevertheless, continued Mr. Pulles,
failure to make such comparisons did underline a sericus lack. Ferhaps if we had had in the past net estimates or comparative estimates
of the U. S. and USSR positions, these might have been helpful to the
Council in its consideration, for example, of the bellistic missiles
program. Ke wes therefore sugrssting the creation of some sort of
new organiceticn, with a very srall staff, which coujd from time to
tine formulate these comperative or net estimates.
Dr. Killian pointed out to the President that his Board of
Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities had supported the general idea which Mr. Dulles was now advancing, although the Board had
not suggested a procedure to accomplish this objective.
The Fresident otserved that such comparative information was
of such a sensitive and secret character that he almost felt himself
in the position of insisting that no one individual could ever pcssess
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