boda E_ EHH EHH HEHEHE HHEHEKHHEKHEKHHE KEKE KE KdD DOD G@NEIDENTIAL PART !V, CHAPTERS 1 and 2 CHAPTER 1 CONCLUSIONS 1.1 EPGlogistics and the associated problems of funding, advance procurementof longlead-time items, and delay in the preparation of the definitive plans of construction resulted in the performance of work on a “crash” basis and a marked increase in the total cost of the program. 1.2 The expanded scope of the operation to include Johnston Island contributed to a serious shortage of experienced security personnel within TG 7.5. 1.3. The retention of responsibility for TG 7.5 radiological safety within TG 7.5 proved successful in protecting the interests of the AEC and should be continued during any future operation. 1.4 ‘In view of the magnitude and successful completion of Operation HARDTACK, Phase I, it is concluded that all staff sections of TG 7.5 and H&N accomplished an outstanding job in the planning and execution of TG 7.5 operations. CHAPTER 2 RECOMMENDATIONS The following recommendations are based on the concept that future operations at EPG will be comparable in scope to Operation REDWING and HARDTACK, Phase I: 2.1 The concept of testing in the Pacific has changed gradually over the past several vears, and it appears that even greater changes may well he in prospect. Preliminary studies indicate that an appreciable reduction could be made in the personnel strength required to conduct an operation the magnitude of HARDTACK, Phase I, under the revised concept of organization. Any appreciable reduction in personne! will release drastically nevded facilities. including harracks. warehousing. etc. It is recommended that a joint AEC-DOD review be made of the iest organization structure and of theAEC-DOD agreement, with particular regard to distribution of support services between the two agencies. 2.2 Phasing of the use of EPG to one primary User (LASL. UCRL. or DOD) at anyone time would tend to reduce further the total manpower requirements and would result in stabilization of the Contractors’ work force to a lower level. It is obvious that such a policy would not only reduce scientific personnel strength but would likewise reduce the strength of all support- ing Task Groups. dividual projects approved by competent authority cognizant of the current MODUS OPERANDi and based on probable future scopes of activity. Definitive plans would be reviewed in a more orderly and realistic manner preliminary to an authorization for construction on a normaltime basis. 2.5 Future budget planning should provide for the bulk of permanent construction in the fiscal year preceding the operational period. This will result in a more economical and orderly construction program. 2.6 Funds should be advanced for preliminary and final engineering of expendable test facilities as soon as the basic needs become known, even if a test series is not immediately forseeable. Construction would be authorized only after Scientific Users have demonstrated to AEC higher authority that a specific device requires testing in the manner proposed. Many preliminary and final plans probably would be wasted; however, the savings realized in “non- crash” construction programs would more than offset added engineering costs due to discarded plans. 2.7 A substantial increase in investment in the Contractor’s current-use stores inven- TG 7.5 should be assigned complete responsibility for all radiological safety support services at EPG during interim and tory should be authorized, in view of the fact that advance procurement of long-lead-time items 2.4 such items as coaxial cable, submarine cable, de- 2.3 operational periods. Funds for PAC construction should be _ authorized on the basis of an APPROVED projected 5-vear long-range program, with in- is highly important to the orderly and economical consummation of a test program. Emphasis should be placed on building up the inventoryof humidification units, generators, PI&S building sections, etc. ~ go Page 83