Certain scientific, technical, and operational per- sonnel of TG 7.1 were authorized in writing and to the zero points, both ashore and afloat. There were no security infractions associated with controlling access to these areas; however, in several instances the mechanics of control were seriously in danger of compromise as a result of the failure of some scientific personnel at zero locations to cooperate with the access controls. This situation was intensified by a lack of adequate numbers of experienced security per- to transport intra-atoll, in their personal cus- tody, Categories II and IIT materials. sonnel to provide frequent field reconnaissance. Agreements reached betwen TG’s 7.1 and 7.5 later corrected this situation. 7.9 7.14 Due to the delay in the acquisition of PAC funds and the shortage of stock- piled construction materials, required physical security installations, such as replacement perimeter fences for the Administration Compound and the CMR area, Site Elmer; guard shacks; and pertinent communications, were completed at a critically late date. In some instances, emer- gency measures had to be adopted to provide suitable protection for classified materials and documents which arrived at EPG prior to the completion of the physical security plant. 7.10 The number of “travel control” points was reduced during this Operation. There- fore, numerous <igns pointing out security areas and badge requirements were posted. Military and H&N guard patrols were utilized to enforce access to such areas: these guards also made periodic checks to see that required badges were worn. 7.11 The HARDTACK -ecurity badge system became operationa: on 15 March 1958. During the Operation, a total of 20,995 badges was issued to all participants. This figure included regular. special, and exchange badges and replacements for broken or lost badges. The badge system, as described in SOP 205-6, required minor modifications to change the de- sign of the Official Observer badge and to provide several new badge types to identify observers from the United Kingdom, NATO, and the United Nations. Color layouts depicting the security badge svstem were made available to Headquarters, JTF-Seven. and all Task Groups for orientation and information purposes. A record of security infractions incurred by personnel of TG’s 7.1 and 7.5 was maintained. In each case, the individual responsible was properly cautioned, and steps were taken to prevent recurrences. A total of 44 security in- fractions were committed by personnel of TG 7.1. Thirteen of the 44 security infractions weve committed by military personnel assigned to TG 7.1. Twenty-four infractions were committed by personnel of TG 7.5, of which 23 were by H&N personnel and 1 by AEC. There were no security violations committed by personnel of TG 7.1 or 7.5, as defined by AEC regulations. 7.15 An extensive locally-designed security° poster program was initiated by the HEN security organization. These posters, suitable for indoor or outdoor use, were placed at strategic locations and were relocated at frequent intervals on a firm schedule. Color slides of some of these posters were also shown periodically at the movies operated by H&N. 7.16 Emergency burn-barrels and burn-boxes were fabricated and supplied for use as required by Headquarters, JTF-Seven, for elements of TG’s 7.1 and 7.5. New incinerators of advance design were provided in the adminis- tration compounds on Sites Elmer and Nan for routine destruction of classified waste and documents. 7.17 The H&N security organization, in conjunction with TG 7.1 and the AEC of- fices, compiled and coordinated with the Military Police a location list of all safe files utilized by TG 7.1 and the AEC offices for the storage of classified documents and materials. During non- A total of 185 HARDTACK security badges were reported as lost and not recovered. constituting a loss percentage of 0.009. Persons reporting their badge as lost were requird to execute a “Lost Security Badge Statement.” working and lunch periods, the MP's made se- 7.18 maximum security controls for access to at the EPG were several from LASL, maintained in the custody of Dr. W. E. Ogle, CMRarea at Site Elmer. Comparison cards con- Secret” teletypes were sent from DMA, AEC, Washington, to General Luedecke, the senior 7.12 Exchange badges were used to ensure exclusion areas. such as the assembly areas and barge slips at Sites Elmer and Nan and the taining photos were utilized to control access to curity checks of the respositories and adjacent unattended office areas. Records were also kept of HEN classified repositories which were similar- ly checked by H&N guards. 7.18 The only AEC “Top Secret’? documents cientific Deputy, JTF-Seven. Several ‘Top AEC representative: however, they were subsequently downgraded to ‘‘Secret.” om storage bunkers for test devices and components rT FeO HO HR OO re Seven. Upon arrival at the EPG, custody of these materials was assumed by the CTG 7.5. Military Guards were utilized to safeguard movements of such materials outside guarded security areas. AEC couriers accompanied al} intra-atoll movements and inter-atoll air shipments of Category I materials. Inter-atoll surface shipments were in the custody of CTG 7.3. A on Ay ay PART Il, CHAPTER 7 GUNTIDEN ha WN ~J ar Page 54