ovo de ves se ee eed, VID I_ HEF KES I ‘AGS GONTIDENTIAL PART Hl, CHAPTER 7 CHAPTER 7 SECURITY, CLASSIFICATION, AND PUBLIC INFORMATION 7.5 PLANNING 71 A series of conferences and the interchange of correspondence between Head- quarters, JTF-Seven, and TG 7.5 contributed to the establishment or reaffirmation of basic security policies for Operation HARDTACK. Among these policies were controls for access to EPG; minimum security clearances for military and civilian participants; designation of security areas; strength and deployment of military guards; security badge system; security briefing media; control of photography; use of couriers: and shipment of test devices and other classified materials and documents between the Mainland and EPG. These subjects, with the exception of the latter one, were formalized in the JTF-Seven SOP series. The shipping in- structions are contained in Appendix 1 to Annex C, JTF-Seven Administrative Plan 1-58. 7.2 The minimum clearances for HARD- TACK participants at EPG were es- tablished as “Confidential” for military personnnel and “‘L’’ for AEC Contractor personnel, as of the 1 March 1958 “cut-off” date. This date was later extended to 15 March 1958. 7.3 At the request of AEC, CJTF-Seven made the arrangements necessary to obtain Military Police from units having had previous experience in guarding nuclear weapons storage areas. Due to economic limitations and the inahilitv of the Department of the Armyto provide such experienced guard personnel in quan- titics equivalent to those during Operation RED- The normal complement of AEC security personne] assigned to the Pacific Operations Division of the Office of Test Operations, ALO, was increased to handle the anticipated operational work load. This was accomplished by obtaining personnel from other ALO offices and from the San Francisco Operations Office. For the most part, such personnel were inexperienced in test securitv problems; and, as they were assigned to the EPG for varying periods of TDY, considerable on-the-job training was required. 7.6 Test devices for the DOD-sponsored underwater and high altitude shots were transported to the EPG via the USS BOXER. By agreement with CJTF-Seven, the Commanding Officer of the USS BOXER was designated an AEC Military Courier by the Manager, ALO, to provide security protection to the muclear materials enroute to the EPG and to certain items remaining aboard after arrival. Custodv of the materials off-loaded from the USS BOXER at EPG was assumed by the AEC SS Materials Accountability Representative (AC/S, E-2. TG 7.5). Accountability for all HARDTACK SS materials was the delegated respon- sibility of the AEC SS Materials Accountability Representative. 7.7 bulk mail of TG 7.1 to eliminate customs interception and examination. which were encoun- tered during Operation REDWING. OPERATIONAL PHASE WING. it was necessary to reduce the number of Military Guards for Operation HARDTACK. The REDWING total of 260 Military Police (252 enlisted men and 8 officers) was reduced Arrangements were made with the US Bureau of Customs to identify official 7.8 In addition to the Category 1 materials hrought to the EPG via the USS BOXER, there was a total of 52 special flights to 141 “Top Secret™-cleared MP’s (133 enlisted men and & officers) for HARDTACK. This decrease in force necessitated the elimination used to transport the bulk of such matertals to the test site. Whenever possible, classified use. A joint FT F-Seven and AEC training session using armed officer couriers operating under the Sandia Base to train the Military Police in the were required to return test devices or components, which, for various reasons, could not he sent on “sample return’ aircraft. From a security standpoint, there were no incidents to of certain “travel control” points and the re duction of the ratio of guards for contingency was held for several weeks in January, 1958, at fundamentals of the AEC physical security pro- cedures and in th: HARDTACK security badge system. 7.4 A detachment of “Top Secret”-cleared Marines was assigned to TG 7.3, based on the USS BOXER. and detailed to guard shot barges at Bikini Atoll and to provide a military guard for inter-atoll water shipments of test evices. spare test device components were brought back to the Mainland on “sample return” aircraft, provisions of SOP 205-4. Nine special flights cause concern. In the early phases of the Oper- ation, some couriers of classified nuclear materials of subordinate exigency were not receiving complete instructions on the Mainland regarding where and to whom to surrender the nuclear materials upon arrival at EPG. That condition was quickly corrected by Headquarters JTF- Page 53 SC