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G@NEIDENTIAL
PART !V, CHAPTERS 1 and 2
CHAPTER 1
CONCLUSIONS
1.1
EPGlogistics and the associated problems
of funding, advance procurementof longlead-time items, and delay in the preparation of
the definitive plans of construction resulted in
the performance of work on a “crash” basis and
a marked increase in the total cost of the
program.
1.2
The expanded scope of the operation to
include Johnston Island contributed to a
serious shortage of experienced security personnel within TG 7.5.
1.3.
The retention of responsibility for TG 7.5
radiological safety within TG 7.5 proved
successful in protecting the interests of the AEC
and should be continued during any future operation.
1.4
‘In view of the magnitude and successful
completion of Operation HARDTACK,
Phase I, it is concluded that all staff sections of
TG 7.5 and H&N accomplished an outstanding
job in the planning and execution of TG 7.5
operations.
CHAPTER 2
RECOMMENDATIONS
The following recommendations are based
on the concept that future operations at EPG
will be comparable in scope to Operation REDWING and HARDTACK, Phase I:
2.1
The concept of testing in the Pacific has
changed gradually over the past several
vears, and it appears that even greater changes
may well he in prospect. Preliminary studies indicate that an appreciable reduction could be
made in the personnel strength required to conduct an operation the magnitude of HARDTACK,
Phase I, under the revised concept of organization. Any appreciable reduction in personne! will
release drastically nevded facilities. including
harracks. warehousing. etc. It is recommended
that a joint AEC-DOD review be made of the
iest organization structure and of theAEC-DOD
agreement, with particular regard to distribution
of support services between the two agencies.
2.2
Phasing of the use of EPG to one primary
User (LASL. UCRL. or DOD) at anyone
time would tend to reduce further the total manpower requirements and would result in stabilization of the Contractors’ work force to a lower
level. It is obvious that such a policy would not
only reduce scientific personnel strength but
would likewise reduce the strength of all support-
ing Task Groups.
dividual projects approved by competent authority cognizant of the current MODUS OPERANDi and based on probable future scopes of
activity. Definitive plans would be reviewed in
a more orderly and realistic manner preliminary
to an authorization for construction on a normaltime basis.
2.5
Future budget planning should provide
for the bulk of permanent construction in
the fiscal year preceding the operational period.
This will result in a more economical and orderly
construction program.
2.6
Funds should be advanced for preliminary
and final engineering of expendable test
facilities as soon as the basic needs become
known, even if a test series is not immediately
forseeable. Construction would be authorized
only after Scientific Users have demonstrated to
AEC higher authority that a specific device requires testing in the manner proposed. Many
preliminary and final plans probably would be
wasted; however, the savings realized in “non-
crash” construction programs would more than
offset added engineering costs due to discarded
plans.
2.7
A substantial increase in investment in
the Contractor’s current-use stores inven-
TG 7.5 should be assigned complete responsibility for all radiological safety
support services at EPG during interim and
tory should be authorized, in view of the fact
that advance procurement of long-lead-time items
2.4
such items as coaxial cable, submarine cable, de-
2.3
operational periods.
Funds for PAC construction should be
_
authorized on the basis of an APPROVED
projected 5-vear long-range program, with in-
is highly important to the orderly and economical
consummation of a test program. Emphasis
should be placed on building up the inventoryof
humidification units, generators, PI&S building
sections, etc.
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