i
FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER IV
1.
Dr. Edward reeoa eeof CalSforata Hadiation Laboratory, was
convinced that: 73a eee
ie
ee
GE | Dr.
Graves conceded ‘that there was a slight possibi itty of such a high
yield, but LASL personnel were willing to stand by their figures.
Dr. Teller's theory caused concern within the Air Task Croup because
7.4 could not easily overlook a possibility that could result in se-
vere damage or loss of aircraft and crews. The effects aircraft
were positioned according to the maximum probable yield on all shots.
Dr. Teller had made the same prediction on MIKE Shot in 1952, but
LASL's estimatehadbeenbarneontinthelongmm,
-
nas
ene 7)
DELETED
2.
Unpredictable weather was the main reason for this unforeseen fallout. In fact, the greatest single difficult factor throughout the
operation was weather. It affected the ability of the scientists to
collect data, the Air Task Group's ability to take photographs and
collect samples and, above all, it determined the areas of radioac-
tive fall-out.
(CONFIDENTIAL)
3.
Report of the Commander, Task Group 7.1, Los Alamos Scientific Lab-
4.
Before and during the Operation there were many shifts of time and
location schedules for detonation. The tables listed in the following pages show some of the different time scheduling, and the arrival
and assembly times of the devices.
AEWLHC
74