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discussion with Secretary Dulles. He suggested that if a decision
to accelerate were made immediately, one squadron of IRBM's could
be made operational by the end of 1958.
While this would involve
additional funds, such a course of action would help the morale of
our Allies and assist the United States in the forthcoming NATO
meeting. Secretary McElroy said he could not be more definite at
the moment on this subject.
When Secretary McElroy had finished his comments, the President
asked Secretary
es if he had any questions.
Secretary Dulles
said that he had/a
talk just prior to this Council meeting with
Secretary Quarles and Mr. Killian. He had informed them of his be-
lief that it would be important to be able to say at the NATO meeting
that we were capable
of making available to NATO (in addition to our
commitment to the United Kingdom) one squadron of IRBM's by the end
of Calendar 1959.
This date was probably the earliest when NATO would
be in a position of readiness, with respect to bases, training, etc.,
to receive such squadrons.
But if we could make such a statement as
this, the effect would be very reassuring.
—
The President inquired whether the countries receiving IRBM
squadrons would undertake to build the necessary ground installations.
Secretary Dulles said that this question had not been settled. The
President said he supposed that ground installations for IRBM squadrons
would be very expensive. Secretary Quarles confirmed the President's
supposition by stating that the ground installation would prove almost
as expensive as the IRBM itself.
The cost might amount to somewhere
in the neighborhood of 50 million dollars if all the equipment, etc.
were included. The President commented that the elaborate character
of such a ground installation suggested to him that such installations
would be prime targets for an enemy attack.
In order to avoid requesting New Obligational Authority without
precise foreknowledge of the need for appropriated funds for missile
Production (when operational capability is ascertained), Secretary
Anderson asked whether we should seek authority for the Secretary of
Defense, with the approval of the President, to make transfers among
appropriated funds or alternatively should authority be sought for the
Secretary of Defense, likewise with Presidential approval, to contract
for the purchase of missiles in addition to appropriated funds, at a
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time when Congress was not in session.
Secretary McNeil thought that such a part-appropriation and
part-contract authority would lead to difficulties except on a onetime basis. The President, however, seemed to prefer Secretary Anderson's
idea for seeking contract authority over and above appropriations - for
use when Congress was not in session - on a missile break-through.
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