7.3 the uvavy,
from tue
7.4 tne Air rorce, and 7.5 the contractors (primarily
firm of Lolmes and sarver)
and Leoartment
of Defense peonle.
Tne Joint Task Force concept vas one originated for the Able and saker
tests at Bikini «toll in ly4o0 and was continued tnereafter.
[t had
been proven the most effective and efficient way of combinine tecnnical
KnOw-now, military and security interests and an equitaole sharing of
the knowledze resulting from sucau tests.
Task torce Conmander,
Upon the shoulders of the
and tue neads of the
five segments of the Force
rested tie responsibility for tue safety of all personnel and che
successful execution of the tests.
Sometime in tne _-arly morning hours
of ilaren Ll, 1954, taformation was received concerning the status of tne
snips, personnel and security surrounding 5U,00U square mile zone waicii
extended from 10° 15' to 12° 45' north latitude and from 160° 35' to
luo? 16' east longitude.
Also received was meteorological information
concerning wind ana weatuer conditions.
After all data vas received
and evaluated, the decisiou was made to go anead with the first test of
tue ‘Castle’ series.
‘tie code name for the sleeping giant bottled up
in its steel and concrete wonv was "Bravo."
At one minute, or even a few seconds before 06:45 hilo (local) time
on ware 1, 1954,
tne tragic events which would follow 'Bravo's"
detonation could nave been prevented, but incredibly, the decision vas
wade to go aiead, despite an incomplete and somewnat alarming report
concerning tne winds avove uikini.*
for '.fike’ snot on inewetok in 1952
available wind information shoved winds heading to the vest from sea
* bee appendix for
igs
“slike uw and Bravo" wind direction charts.
7
10146 1b