Chapter 3 Resume 3.1 INTRODUCTION The radiological safety unit for Operation Greenhouse performed a much more efficient job than was performed on any of the preceding tests. This was primarily due to two factors: (1) availability of better trained and more experienced personnel, and (2) closer integration of the radiological safety unit with the over-all scientific program. The latter was by far the more important. Regardless of the training of the individuals in a unit, the job cannot be efficiently performed unless they are well indoctrinated in the over-all program. The personnel of the unit was adequate in numbers. The group arrived about one month before the first test. It was felt by some of the monitors that two weeks before would have been sufficient. However, when all the factors involved, such as acclimation, familiarization with the various instruments, and personal the instruments proved to be more reliable than heretofore, because of better design and better sulted in exposure of recovery and monitor personnel which could be avoided if time of recovery were dictated by scientific need rather than emotion. The problem of establishing a certain dosage allowance should also be given further study. Because of the ever-changing weather conditions at Eniwetok, it should be assumed that fall-out must be accepted. To establish a limit of 3 r per test and then have more than this as a result of fall-out alone creates confusion in the mind of both the military and the civilian worker. CONCLUSIONS 1, The organization, training, and operations of TU 3.1.5 were adequate. 2. Personnel, supplies, and instrumentation were adequate. 3.3 plies, clothing, and tools were adequate. It is felt that the assignment of responsibility for radiological safety to the various task groups was in error. Even though the utmost cooperation between all groups was exercised, there was an occasional lack of coordination which would not have existed if the responsibility had been in one group. In future testing much thought and consideration should be given to re-entry time for scien, implementation of the experiment. This re- 3.2 contacts with the other workers, are considered, one month appears to be about the proper time. Instrumentation was adequate, and in general construction. Far less repair work was required than on previous operations. All sup- tific recovery on varioustest islands. It is felt that the personal enthusiasm on the part of some experimenters caused the recovery of data sooner than was necessary for successful RECOMMENDATIONS 1. That in future testing all radiological safety work be performed by one unit, under the Commander of the Scientific Task Group. 2. That further study and consideration should be given to re-entry time. Early re-entry should not be made unless it is essential to save valuable data. 3. That further consideration toward raising established permissible dosage during test operation be subjected to study. wham nes ree ESHEReS FOIE | ON