Becauseliving conditions deteriorated further
the United States instituted small trust funds.
For the Bikinians, the trust fund yielded semi-annual
interest payments of approximately $15 per person.
lier showed a marked increase in the were 5 to 6 times higher than examount uf radioacuve nuclides in the pected.
people y bodies. These tests show
that tne Bikinians were ingesting
Throughout the rehabilitation of
higher thun acceptable concentratlons of cancer-causing radiation
from the water und from food grown
in the island’s contaminated soil.
The U.S. government then began
importing all food (except localfish.
Which was declared safe) and donk
to Bikini. This food program has
compounded the Bikini dilemma:
while the Bikinians have been told
that the island is radioactive and po-
tentiaily dangerous. the prospect of
free food and housing and a chance
to move from Kili—called the
“prison bv residents—has encouraged peuple to returm.
In euriv 1978. the Enerey Re-
search and Development Association considered moving the people to
another island in Bikini Aroll—
Eneu-——ind was growing fruits and
Vegetadies In an experimental garden
to test radioactivity levels there. Results from these experiments. how-
ever, werent expected for about a
year.
According to a careful report in
the Los Angeles Times. by February
1978 it was official government policy: Bikini was unfit for people to
live on. Nevertheless. in Apnil. Trust
Territory officials, testifying at a
Bikini. the Energy Research and
Development Association and the
Department of Energy had con-
may de the only global source of data
agencies treatment of the Marshal-
tion is thought to contribute the
change.
From the nuclear bomb tests at
on humans where intake via ingesmajor fraction of plutonium body
burden.
A 1976 Lawrence Livermore Laboratory scientist stated that Bikini
“is posstbly the best available
source of data for evaluating the
transfer of piutonium across the gut
wall after being incorporated into
biological systems.
Government scientists vehemently deny they have used the
Marshallese for expenmentation. A
DOE official explained. “It was done
by technical tvpes anxious to know
about the transfer of radioactive elements.”
Intenor Department officials an-
nounced in Mav 1978 that the atoll
would be evacuated within 90 days.
re-estaolishing the Bikinitans on
could remain on Bikini without harm
unul the expenments on Eneu were
reminiscent of the 1946 removal.
“There are some things we didn't
Eneu [sland, insisted that the people
completed tn January 1979—provided that thev didn't eat any:
coconuts, and that the coming medical tests showed. as was expected,
no large tncreases in internal radiation levels.
In the April 1978 medical examinations. however, the Bikinians’ internal radiation levels ranged up to
0.980. or nearly tice the U.S.
maximum safety standard of 0.5
rems. At the same time. the pre-
liminary results from the experimental garden at Eneu Island
showed that radioactivity levels
many of whom have now retumed to
their home atoll to work with
vews of the island—-many of which thousands of U.S. army soldiers in
suggest the Bikinians were unwitting the massive nuclear debns cleanup.
subjects for scientific radiation tests.
Until the scientific community and
A recent study forthe Department of independent orgamzations begin cntEnergy concluded that ©’ Bikini toll ically to monitor U.S. government
ducted countless radiological sur-
and the people returned to Kili Island. [n late August, Interior representatives went to Bikini to super-
congressional hearing on tunding for
suffered radiation exposure until
they returned to their radioactive island atter 25 years. Now the Bikimians are an exposed population.
too. And who knows what the future
holds for the Enewetak people—
vise the evacuation, in many ways
feel
good
about,”
said
Taro
Lokebal, who serves as liaison be-
tween the Bikini Council and the
United States. “"The (U.S.) High
Commissioner made the people
rush. ... Some things were left
behind—pigs. chickens, lumber. We
had to have our ceremony on the
ship. It was supposed to be on the
shore but we had no time.”
Though the Bikintans. like the
Enewetakese. suffered the devastating physical and psvchologicalef-
lese. their Situation is not apt to
Bikini and Enewetak to the medical
treatment of the irradiated islanders.
the 30 years of American trusteeship
has brought the Marshallese anvthing but the conditions promised tn
the U.N. trust agreement.©
Conard. Robert A.. M.D.. et al.. A Twean
Year Reviewof Medical Findings in a Mar-
shutlese Population Accidentaliv Exposed
to Rudivactive Fullout. Brookhaven Nattonal Laboratory. Washington, D.C.: Department of Commerce. 1975. available
from National Technical [nformation Service.
Congress of Micronesia Special Joint Cummittee Concerning Rongelap and Ctirtk:
1973 Report. Koloma. Ponape 96941: The
Congress.
Detrou Free Press. Sept. 2. 1978.
Gensutkin (Japan) Medical Survey Team. Reportion the tavestieation of Damage Dune
&v the Bikini Hvdreven Bomb Test to the
Peupie of the Marshall tsiands. rev. ed.:
Tokyo. Japan: Gensutkin, 4th A.. Akimoto
Bldg..
2-19 Tsukasa-Che.
Kanda.
Chiyoda-ku. Tokyo. 1973.
Honolulu Advertiser, Oct. 10. 1978: June [6.
20. TI. and 22, 1977. March 19, 1978: July
30. 1978.
International Herald Tribune. Apnil i9. 1978,
Kiste. Robert C. The Sikinians: A Study in
Forced Migration. Menio Park, Ca.: Cummings Publishing Co.. 1974.
Lawrence Livermore Laboratory. Dose Assessment at Bikini Atoll. UCRL-51879 Pr,
Washington. D.C.: Department of Commerce. June, 3. 1977. available from National Technical [nformazion Service.
Los Angeles Times. June I!, 1977.
McHenry. Donaid F. Micronesia; Truss Betraved. Washington, D.C.: Camegie Endowment for Internation: Peace. 1978.
Micronesian Independent. Sept. [2. (975,
New York Times. March 23. [978.
fects of relocation and, at times.- Washington Post. March 23 and 27,
even near starvation, they had never
Aprit 3. 1978.
February 1979
1978;
The Bulletin 15