b.
In March 1956 the DOD and the AEC announced an additional program for
representatives of U, S. news media and the Federal
tion to view the CHEROKEE shot.
Civil Defense Administra-
Although these representatives were not cleared
for access to classified information, necessary security measures were established and plans for accommodating these observers in the PPG were rapidly
developed,
The Navy instalied special commmication equipment in the USS MT
MCKINLEY and diverted the ship to Kwajalein.
vided their own transportation to Hawaii.
The news and FCDA personnel pro-
They were flown from there by MATS
to Kwajalein and taken aboard the Mf MCKINLEY,
May and witnessed the LACROSSE detonation.
They arrived in the PPG on 5
After several delays because of
weather, they witnessed the CHEROKEE detonation on 21 May.
They were then
returned to Hawaii where they made their om arrangements for transportation
to the U.S.
Though their presence was not without complications, it is con-
sidered to have been a very worthwhile program for public enlightenment on
atomic testing, as wide coverage was given in the newspapers, radio and television.
This coverage included world wide dissemination of task force radio-
logical safety precautions which served to aliay consern among foreign pecples.
c.
No representatives from industry as such participated in the cbserver
programs.
For future atomic tests, it is believed desirable that consideration
be given to including in the observer programs highly selected industrial representatives, who hold appropriate clearances, of stature not beiow that of the
vice-president level.
It should be expected that this kind of program would
enhance good relations between government and industry, ard provide for an
exchange of technical information and new ideas to the mutual advantage of
the DOD, AEC and industry.
12,
INTELLIGENCE, SECURITY AND PUBLIC INFORMALION
a.
Intelligence
(1)
Daily and weekly intelligence summaries were received from the
various service intelligence agencies and from the CIA in order that CJTF SEVEN
might be kept informed of the general situation in, and adfacert t=>, the area
of £ operaticns .
(2)
COPIED/D
LANL RO 2:
A epesial intelligence estimate of enemy capabilities to inter-
fere with the activities of the task force was requested from the Chief of
al
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