was recommended for TRU contamination only. The soil levels recommended were associated with 10 percent to 100 percent of the ICRP lung values for individuals. Enjebi Island was to be cleaned up for TRU but not resettled at this time due to high fission product doses. Runit, the island for disposal of contaminated soil and debris, was to remain quarantined. From the outset, the task group's recommendations were the subject of controversy. Qn occasion, a strong technical defense of their validity was needed. Agreement on the final draft criteria was a fragile product. Some NV staff did not support the recommendations. DONA staff preferred to establish their own cleanup criteria. EPA staff agreed that they would not disagree, but were looking toward developing their own TRU cleanup criteria. The Enewetak people and their legal council sought cleanup that would achieve zero risk for their return. The task group's recommendations were the subject of an AEC staff paper that was approved by the Commission. The remaining figures identify agency responsibilities, the task group members, the basis for their judgments and recommendations, options considered, their conclusions, the position taken on risk, the features of the EIS related to Task Group recommendations, and some of the obvious differences between the Enewetak criteria and current EPA draft dose limits. The role of those who performed the early work to develop Enewetak cleanup criteria largely ended with the issuance of the task group's report. Cleanup planning, field operations, and participants were documented in DOE and DNA reports. However, no overall post-mortem evaluation of this project has been conducted and little effort made to learn from all aspects of this unique experience. So far as I know, this meeting is the first time that the Enewetak project has been reviewed since DOE's report on field operations was issued. In that context I would like to acknowledge the important contributions made toward the success of this effort by the task group members and particularly Walter Nervik of LLNL. Jack Healy of LANL and Lyn Anspaugh of LLNL provided the critical relationship between TRU soil concentrations, air concentrations, and dose to lung. Harold Beck and Jim McLaughlin of HASL, Paul Gudiksen of LLNL, and Oliver Lynch of NVO provided input for external doses. Vic Nelson of the University of Washington and Vic Noshkin of LLNL provided marine data. Bill Robinson of LLNL provided the many dose estimates needed for a matrix of land use and cleanup alternatives. The reason for citing these contributions is to emphasize that development of site-specific criteria and options for cleanup of a contaminated environment requires a large amount of detailed environmental information that has been evaluated for use in cleanup planning. Mandatory cleanup dose limits derived from extremely low risk values such as those in the EPA draft, had they been in existence in 1973, may well have made Enewetak cleanup appear to be an impossible task with a price tag that was out of the