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3.19.2
3-97
Personnel and Administration
Security.
The Joint Security Indoctrination Letter for Task Groups
7.1 and 7.5 was tssued on December 23, 1957, for Hardtack.
:
It
4s strongly recommended that such a document, as well as other
security procedures, be issued no later than 1 September o¢ 4
year preceding a Spring operation to allow time for distribut.c
and use of the letter before personnel depart for overseas.
ra
For Redwing and Hardtack, the TG 7.1 Military Executive
performed ad@itional duty as Security Officer. ‘Tt 4s recon.
mended that a full time Security Officer ba assigned for futur
operations, preferably a civilian with experience in AEC, security procedures.
CinecPac Serial 020 continued to create confusion,
and irritation.
delay,
It is strongly recommended that the need for
this directive be reviewed on at least two counts: (1) Since /
TG 7.1 personnel have either military or AEC clearance before’s
being ordered to EPG, it seems redundant to declare them "good\
security risks," and (2) The list of contraband items should be
reviewed and either eliminated or shortened and clarified.
Transportation.
MATS performed its primary mission of moving personnel ana\.’
cargo in a satisfactory manner.
However,
the record of aborts,/
late departure, and inconvenient schedules continued during
;
Hardtack to the extent that the MATS flights to and from EPG te
are universally regarded as the worst feature of a generally
unpleasant tour of duty.
It is recommended that efforts con-
tinue toward improving the convenience and reliability of MATS
transportation.
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