3-68
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an appendix to an annex of the AIMINISTRATIVE PLAN NO. 1-57 was published
on 1 November 1957.
This a pendix incorporated all courier instructions
for transmission of documents and material between EPG and other locations,
and within the EPG,
Although procedures were not always followed, in that
written authority was not always obtained prior to couriering classified
documents, no security violations were observed,
The problems present during past operations in the shipment of bulky
classified materials through the mail were not evident during HARDTACK.
This resulted from adequate planning and coordination with Oustoms by TG 7.5
prior to the operational period,
3e1h.3
Access to Restricted Data,
JTF SEVEN SOP 205-3, "Security Clear-
ances," specified prerequisites for access to Restricted Data.
The ex--
change of RD between DOD and LOD-contractor personnel and AEC contractors
required certification on each individual possessing a military clearance,
No travel orders were published on these individuals until proper certifiTwo participant areas were established:
cation was on file with T0 7.5.
certifying officers at Los Alamos processed headquarters and Task Units 1,
2, hy 5 and 6; certifying officers at FC AFSWP, Sandia Base, processed TU=3.
During CASTLE all TG 7,1 personnel requiring access were certified, with
the concurrence of CTG 7.1, by CJTF SEVEN, During REDWING and HARDTACK this
responsibility was delegated to the Military Executive, Jel, and to FC,
AFSWP, with a minimum number of alternates, which resulted in a vast ime
provement over the JTF SEVEN certification, in that efficiency, facility
and closer control were enbknced,
3elhel, Exclusion Areas. JTF SEVEN SOP 205-6 directed the establishment
of policies and procedures on Exclusion Areas,
caren
Access was predicated on
the Sigma Category indicated on the security badge, and on the "need to
know.""
C
Access lists for each Exclusion Area were published, and exchange
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