eee - ve @ Ob eee ewe nee tee ere ee ee wens are eee je eee epee eee ee eee eee Ce a | eee ee ee hee eee ee * | . Ce ee see tema peewee ree he w we * eae ; eee ecw wee IS omen ewe eee eae ee eee a ee ee ee ater eee eee re i weno Cee ee EO OO OREO eee CET OEE EHO OO RTE EEO HEH | ee Ce ee) TICLE SllihiiLlininiisiniitbeinigyy CC ee ee ee) | Ce ee | Ce rr rr 2 4 ee eee eee rte tere eee ee eee eee ee ee enemunae te mee ee see oases eee enero Oe ene ee eons Cr ee ed t i é , . < een i Ce re Ce oe Ce Peter een eee scene e ne ne ass esesee eeuaereca ee | . eeecne i el Ce SU See eee reen eae ee ee see eee eee ereeeeae ae ee eee eee ewe eee 5. Detection Net. ie ie ‘ 2 ‘ ean F; i A net of about 70 detection stations located i within the USSR and China, as described in detail in Attachment A, S backed up by inspection teams and aerial reconnaissance, would be t ip essential for monitoring possible Soviet tests conducted in all feasible environments within those countries. Full operational status would of all nuclear shots in the USSR and China which give signals equivalent th — ad take - ee EA ayFe ES wit Frese as 7 The detection system described above has 6. Risk of Detection. been designed to achieve a high probability of detection and identification a _ techniques and capabilities. |: to ::--+-+..5..+..:-/For the actual enforcement of a moratorium, such eos eee, ee eere ee ee TO TT TTT VE TE TIT TIS Ty Oo rs ee ee 2 | Ce ee | a ee 2 BEET ee rem Fe eee wn Shanes teenewraneeseesnse re ee a | ee i ee eee eee eee enna . eee ee ee ae “se eceoeseor ee er | teem mew ewer eee eee ew eee eee Seat eee eee eee HOR he Oh eee i 7, 77 ids 4 lt tad ‘ i = ee | ene tee eet eens peat tee eer ee ee we hee ree ee he eee ee ed i ee ee) Ce Ce ee ee kK . i tT ~y | ae ee se sess esessseseeseeseseseeaicoereeseeee rerered pt “ane ee “pte he ter pote ge. Ore ee . é ry - cesses eee rm eee eee ree eee eee arf ~ VU) % ee phe 1 a high probability may not be required since it may only be necessary to achieve a situation where the Soviets cannot afford to take the risk of in a clandestine nuclear test. This risk would increase being caught rapidly if several tests were required. :: ai ) require approximately two years after an international agreement is, reached although a few stations could be installed earlier. Without such a detection system located inside the USSR and China, the detection coverage would be inadequate for safeguarding a nuclear test limitation agreement. Should there be an international agreement to pursue technical studies and design of the detection system of the type described in Appendix A, a substantial amount of information could be dis closed by the U. S. without revealing Atomic Energy Restricted Data although it wovld be necessary to disclose presently classified detection