RMI Nuclear Justice Documents

iTERRES.™ POaE ‘na te oe et ‘wae ik TOP SECRET ~ RESTRICTED DATA CONCLUSIONS OF THE AD HOC WORKING GROUP ON THE TECHNICAL FEASIBILITY OF A Se CESSATION OF NUCLEAR TESTING In response to the action taken by the National Security Council meeting on January 6, 1958, a technical panel of the President's Science Advisory Committee, the Department of Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Central Intelligence Agency has made a study of the technical factors affecting an international agreement for the cessation of nuclear tests.1/ The following conclusions have been reached: A. Capabilities of the Present U. S. 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BT Since the present systern was designed to detect tests conducted in the USSR, its capabilities for tests outside the USSR are limited. 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