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REPORT 10 THE PRESIDENT BY THE SECURITY RESOURCES PANEL OF THE
ODM SCIENCE ADVISORYCOMMITIEE
(NSC Action No. 101%; NSC 5724; nsc 5724/1)
Mr. Cutler briefed the Council at very great length on this
agenda item (copy of briefing note filed in the minutes of the meet-
ing; another attached to this memorandum). In the course of his
briefing, Mr. Cutler distributed to the Council a summary of the
recommendations of the Geither Panel and of the comments of the
agencies assigned primary responsibility for commenting on these
recommendations.
of the meeting.)
(Copy of this summary is also filed in the minutes
Lastly, Mr. Cutler distributed a single page en-
titled "Comparison of Estimated US-USSR Missile Operational Cape-
bility" {copy filed in the minutes of the meeting).
At the conclusion of Mr. Cutier's briefing, he first called
upon Dr. Killien, the President's newly-appointed Special Assistant
Por Science and Technology. In commenting on the Panel report, Dr.
Killian said that he would direct his remarks to outlining the principal policy questions which seemed to require decision. He noted
that the Gaither Panel's first concern was with the vulnerability of
SAC to a Soviet surprise bomber attack. To reduce this vulnerability of SAC, the Panel had recommended a five-sided time-phased program, the elements of which Dr. Kiilian outlined. This seemed to
Dr. Killian to raise two questions basic to national security policy:
First, is the Panel's conclusion valid, based on its estimate of the threat in relation to planned defense programs, that the
U. &. air-nuclear retaliatory force will be critically wulnerable to
a@ surprise long-range missile attack in the 1959-1960 time period,
when the United States may not possess a significant ICBM retaliatory force?
Second, if so, what additional precautions should we take
to assure the survival of an adequate retaliatory capability in the
face of a surprise missile and aircraft attack, including the provision of blast shelters?
The third major question was whether the prospective vul-
nerability of manned aircraft in the early 1960's was such as to
justify the technical risks in making the early decisions on production schedules and bases necessary to have a significant missile retaliatory capability during that time period. With respect to the
latter question, Dr. Killian pointed out that the Geither Panel had
recommended a force of 600 ICEMs by mid-1963; whereas present Defense
Department plans called for only 130 as of that date. In general,
added Dr. Killian, the timeephasing of the Defense programs was generally behind that reconmended by the Gaither Panel.
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