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7
E

TARE
RATIVE SEQUENCE OF EVE

By the aorning of Bel day, the wind patterns (forecast and actual)

ware favorable but the trend of the observed resultant wind patterns
was toward an ucfavorable or mrginal condition. No transient shipring
Was reported on the B-2 day PZV sweep centered on a significant fore

cast cloud movement on true bearing of 300° cut to 800 miles from @.

The Bel day search by F2V out to 375 miles on a forecast significent

cloud movenemt on a true bearing of 330° disclosed no transient ship=

ping except the General Patrick, whose course ani speed would take he
outside the hazardous area by anot time,

it the midnight briefing, the

forecast offered a less favorable comiition in the lower levels (10-25
thousand feet).

Resultant winds at about 20,000 feet were forecast in

the direction af Rongelap and Rongerik (Mgure 1); however, it was consitered that the speeds ani altitudes did not warrant a conclusion tit

significant quantities anid levels of debris would be carried out so fer.
TARE Site was forecast to be well in the fall-out area and Na¥ Site to
be in a fairly righ intensity area. Since the 5-1 day forecasts gave
winds tenjding significantly toward SY, a decision was made at the midnight briefing to search on B day absad of the cloud, i.e., centereid on

true bearing of 65° oat to 600 KM and to warn ships out of the 450 EM

einigua redius.

.

The routine Eel8 hour advisory to CDICPACFLT indicated a0 significant fall-out forecast for populated Marshall Islands, eni no safety problems on air or surface routes except surface routes between 275° closk-

wise to 80° out to a radius of 450 KM with possible significant fall-out

in this area. Ho imown shipping was in the forecast fall-out area. The
surface redex was forecast for shot time to shot plus six hours to be
oriented in a narrow sectar to the northeast and « wide sector to the
south, with an additional circular radex area around GZ of radias 15 giles

(Pigures 1 end 2). The sector pointing at Rongelap was considered insig-

nificant due to the low altitudes froma which fall-out could ococur and due
to the very light wints acting on the levels involved.
At the 0430, 1 March briefing, no significant change bad Seen obsexved in the midnight winis received, however, a radsafe reconmeriatios

wes cade

move the task force skips radially further cut froa the mini-

cloud was

ecast to overrun the TARE camp and aove on to the east with

rua of 30

to a minions of 50 NM in the SE quadrant.
lity of overrunning NAN.

a grong

The low level

The resultant wists pointing at

Rongerik and Acngelap were light ani were not forecast to transpart sign
nif{cart debris to these atolls.

bt 0645 the BRAVO detonation was accomplished without hacard to
task force personnel. The bunker firing party reported in safe, but by
O715 the radiation levels were reported rising at the bunker. These
levels contimed to rise to ebout 25 r/hr. The firing party was con~

°

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RESTRICTED DATA

‘ine nestian — aw

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