ae wee i sandiitepenal ating, :. ~~ ¢ a ee a ee i FN taal eee, PAGE 3 RHWNEAAOOOS UNCLAS////EYES ONLY//// 1N SOME DIFFICULTY OUE TO TYPHOON OLGA AND ASKED WHETHER MAG 36 SHOULD CONTINUE WITH ITS DEPLOYMENT PLANS. ROGER ADVISED THAT, IN HIS JUDGMENT, 1T WAS DOUBTFUL THAT THE MISSION COULD BE ACCOMMODATED AT ENIWETOK AS EARLY AS NOV. 1. LT. COL. ROBINSON INFORMED HIM THAT IT WAS FEASIBLE FOR THE CH-53 HELICOPTERS TO STAGE FROM KWAJALEIN AND ASKED WHETHER WOULD BE REASONABLE, APPROXIMATELY NOV. RECEIVE THEM. HE 7 IN LIGHT OF THE FACT, FOR THEM TO COME AHEAD ON 1 AND REMAIN AT KWAJALEIN UNTIL ENIWETOK COULD INDICATED THAT HE HAD ALREADY ASKED KWAJALEIN WHETHER THE NECESSARY SUPPORT COULD BE MADE AVAILABLE AND ASKED RAY TO FOLLOW UP ON THAT QUESTION. ROGER ADVISED LT. COL. ROBINSON THAT HE COULD NOT AND WOULD NOT MODIFY THE EXY¥STING DEPLOYMENT AND SUPPORT REQUEST BUT THAT HE WOULD SEE TO IT THAT AN APPROPRIATE MODIFICATION TO THE REQUEST WAS SENT TO CINCPAC. LATE THAT SAME EVENING, CAPT MCDYER OF THE FIRST MARINE AIR WING IN JAPAN TELEPHONED RAY AT KWAJALEIN TO CONFIRM THE UNDERSTANDING WITH MAG 36. THESE TWO TELEPHONE CALLS, WEITHER OF WHICH WAS ORIGINATED BY ROGER RAY, WERE HIS ONLY DIRECT COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE HELICOPTER RESOURCES. THE FOLLOWING DAY, HOWEVER, HE RECEIVED AN ENFORMATION COPY OF A FIRST MARINE ATR WING MESSAGE TO COM, SEVENTH FLEET, WHEREIN HE, RAY, WAS BADLY MISQUOTED AS TO THE EXTENT OF STORM DAMAGE AT ENIWETOK. HE, THEREFORE, ORIGINATED A SOCTISS: : — . tie. 7.