xXTI was considered and a board convened to investigate that angle. ° The U-2 aircraft was suggested as a possibility, but the note expressed doubt as to its utility or availability because of the secrecy which surrounded the development of the ultra-high altitude, long-range aircraft. The wave of discouragement which caused Colonel Carney to make his appeal for action apparently struck another high Air Force official, simltane- ously, for on the same date Colonel William A, Hunter wrote to the Commander, 950th Test Group, "Assignment of additional B-57B/C or RB-57D aircraft was extremely doubtful until at least 1960,. . . It is, therefore, recommended that you plan to again use the F-8)¢, B-57B, but at the same time consider - that other B-57 aircraft might become available in time to be used." 50 On the following day, Colonel Carney dispatched a message to Air Research and Development Command seeking information concerning capabilities, availability, and other data on the u-2.24 Not until March 1957 did any hope arrive. Returning from a hurried trip to Headquarters, Air Materiel Command, and to the Glenn L. Martin Air Company's factory, Colonel Hunter, Major Malcolm S, Bounds, Maior Charles S, Oldfield and First Lieutenant Robert L, Kelley reported on several concessions and agreements obtained, The quartet learned that Air Materiel Command officials were willing to hasten procurement and modifi- cations, It was learned at the Glenn L, Martin plant, that the need for a two-place version had been eliminated because of perfection of the auto pilot which eliminated the need for removing Strategic Air Command equipment so that the "turn-around-time" of a B-57 borrowed from the 255 aFwisHo SWEH~2-003) at