III
for the B-l\7B aircraft was being developed by Eos Alamos.
Acting upon these plans, the Special ‘Weapons Command submitted
a request to higher levels for the B-l7-type aircraft, but was turned
down on 6 February 1952,
First, there was not enough ground handling
equipment to support the B-l\7 aircraft overseas, production on the
aircraft was lagging about nine months, and, finally, the B-7 bomber
required at least a 11,000-foot runway for safe operation,
This
latter point was important because there was only a 6,700-foot runway
at Kwajalein Island,
Another sampling aircraft had to be found.
Task Group 132.) officers began by considering the B.36, the
B-l5 bomber, F-89, and F-9) fighter-type aircraft,
When data were
compiled a conference was held with Los Alamos personnel on 15
February 1952, where Lieutenant Colonel Carl A. Ousley, on the
planning staff of Task Group 132.4, explained the merits of each
aircraft.
He discussed availability, performance, runway requirements,
communications equipment, maintenance requirements, and reliability,
Thereupon, the confrees decided on the huge B-36 bomber,
Again,
request, went forward to Air Force headquarters.” still the IVY
planners had trouble for on 21 February 1952, General Curtis EB, LeMay
- declared that B~36 aircraft could not be used because this would
interfere with the war plan for the Strategic Air Command,
order the other aircraft were eliminated.
In rapid
The B-l5 was also important
to the war plans and, besides, would be unable to operate from the
Kwajalein runways with the fuel load it would need to accomplish the
sampling missions,
Both the F~89 and the F-9l aircraft did not meet
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