By May 1978, a high percentage of the Marshallese
body levels were above the maximum permissible dose
and the Bikinians were evacuated again.
left) People walking on the
concrete dome covering an atomic bomb
crater on Runit Island, Enewetak
atoll. (below) Nuclear clean up on
Runit Istand. (left) U.S. Army
personnel in full protective gear.
(right) Armypersonnel mixing
plutonium-contnminated soil with cement
to form the massive concrete dome.
Robert Conard of Brookhaven
National Laboratory—which has
coordinated the Marshall Islands
medical program since 1954—
estimated the health risks of the ex-
posure:
x tant,
a
.
‘*Assuming that they [143 people]
had all been there since 1970 and received the average estimated integrated total duse of 2.6 rems for the
penod, based on known radiation-
renee
induced risk data. one would expect
fe eaeeTEY pre OTE mos
only about 0.005 total cases of
leukemia to develop in that popula-
ms
si
tion as a result of their radiation ex-
-
7
+ mmm
ca
-~
7?
.
3
|
‘‘The people fail to understand
howscientists can say they do not
knowall the possible late effects the
radiation can cause. . . and then tell
the people a medical program ts un>
.
\
-Y
“AT
fy
XN
q
:
aN
+
me
ie
sy
cluded both ground and aenal surveys of the islands, according to the
Department of Energy. [t was not
done at Bikini, however. In fact, it
wasn't until the Bikinians filed a fed-
eral law suit in 1975. asking for a
thorough radiological survey of Bikinit and the northern Marshall Is-
lands, that the government agreed to
do it. But because of three years of
bureaucratic infighting among the
Departments of Energy, State and
Interior, the radiological survey was
But Dr. Konrad Kotrady. a former
}
ws
cal survey of Enewetak.”’ whichin-
measuring radiation at the outset of
the Bikini resettlement; it chose to
employ them only at Enewetak.
U.S. policies with respect to pro-
with this philosophy:
'
conducted an “‘exhaustive radiologi-
not conducted until after the evacuation of Bikini in late 1978.
Brookhaven resident physician in
the Marshalls. strongly disagreed
4
radiation measurement techniques
then were not as sophisticated as
those available today: that the surveys of Bikini were far less extensive
than those subsequently carried out
at Enewetak atoll.'* The facts, however, suggest otherwise.
In 1972-1973, the United States
posure.
The need for further medical
examinations ts not indicated based
on possible radiation effects associated with such low doses." "4
> ae el
Conard and representatives of other
U.S. government agencies, in
apologizing for the complications
which occurred. frequently say that
necessary.
If in 40 or SO years medical prob-
lems do occur as a result of the exposure, it would be better if a well
designed medical program was
already in progress to detect the
problems. 7"
December 1980
The United States did have
sophisticated
techniques
for
tecting the health of the Marshallese
have been totally inconsistent. For
example. in 1946, prior to the first
nuclear test series. Operation Crossroads, the people from islands within
a radius of 300 miles of Bikim—
including the Rongelap—were
evacuated as a safety precaution.!?
The yield of these bombs was ap-
proximately 20 kilotens. But in 1954,
there was no official warning of the
Bravo test, much less an evacuation
of the populations. Yet Bravo was
the Jurgest U.S. hydrogen homb
tested—more than [5 megatons.
More than 200 Marshallese on
The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 27