SUBJECT:
Conduct of Future Overseas Nuclear Tests
a better method than we are now using. Over-all control should be centralized, yet most of the day-to-day operations need to be decentralized
to the various Task Groups. Some of the functions need to be consolidated, then established and administered as a direct command function.
13. The Task Force concept of operation is normally a method peculiar to wartime military effort. As its name implies, it is a collection of agencies brought together under a single commander to accomplish
a single goal after which it is normally disbanded. In the case of
Joint Task Force SEVEN, even though established as a permanent joint
command of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with continuing responsibility,
most of the participants (units and personnel) have been lost after
each operation, the Executive Agency has been changed, and a new commander has been designated. While the return of military units and of
civilian and military personnel to their agencies after completion of
the operational phase is appropriate, the change of Joint Task Force
SEVEN's key staff and Commander fails to take advantage of experience
gained and makes each new test series a new experience insofar as the
Task Force command establishment is concerned. This condition, of
course, is further complicated by the rotation of command between the
three Services. It is believed essential that the commander of the
Task Force and his key staff personnel be selected solely on the basis
of military and technical qualifications and that they remain for more
than one operation. The quilifications and experience of the Task Force
Commander in particular should be evaluated. It is further believed
that a qualified individual with appropriate scientific background and
test experience should be assigned on a permanent basis to the Task
Force as Deputy Commander and that additional deputies should be assigned
only on the basis of need and not as Service representatives.
14. The foregoing discussion may be summarized into recommendations
as follows:
a. Unless and until a period of test moratorium is more
definite, plans and preparations for overseas nuclear testing should be
contimed.
b. The task force concept for conduct of overseas nuclear
tests is generally sound, and, with certain adjustments, is suitable,
feasible, and acceptable.
c. Every possible effort should be made to establish the scope
and magnitude of an overseas operation as early as practicable and some
kind of limitation should be recognized.
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