Danae
SUBJECT:
Conduct of Future Overseas Nuclear Tests
functions of 7.2 be transferred to the resident contractor and that
support required from the Army during test operations be requested from
them as operational requirements are determined. It appears impracticable to transfer all of the functions now being performed by Task Group
7.2 to the contractor.
8. A reduced garrison of Army personnel is therefore considered to
be necessary. A small Task Group 7.2 headquarters should continue in
being and should function mich after the fashion of Task Group 7.3.
9. The present arrangement whereby the Navy element of the Task
Force is reduced to a small planning staff during the interim period,
remains under Task Force control and absorbs the Navy elements of support required during an operation appears entirely satisfactory.
10. Even though Task Group 7.4 is disestablished upon completion
of an operation, continuity, know-how and planning functions are maintained by the 4950th atomic Support Group, Air Forces Special Jeapons
Center at Kirtland Air rorce Base. This arrangement has proved to be
workable and is relatively satisfactory. It is believed, however, that
a small planning staff or 7.4 cadre responsible to Commander, JIF-7
should remain in existence during the interim period and that those
Air Force personnel who are stationed at Eniwetok should remain under
operational control of this 7.4 cadre, and, through them, under operational control of the Task Force.
ll. Under present arrangements, the Eniwetok Proving Ground reverts
to the control of the Albuquerque Operations Office and is exercised
through the AEC Resident Manager. The division of responsibilities for
activities in the Proving Ground during the interim period between the
AEC agencies, the Task Force headquarters, Task Group 7.2 and elements
of the Task Group present in the Proving Ground is such that it requires
examination and re-evaluation. The responsibilities and problems involved are so numerous and great as not to be susceptible of proper
examination in this short memorandum and would need to be further investigated by the agencies involved. My evaluation leads me to the
conclusion that the operation, both during the interim period and operational period, could be more efficiently and effectively carried out
if the Eniwetok Proving Ground remained under the operational control
of the Task Force at all times. I will be prepared to discuss this
problem further with either of you at your convenience.
12.
While I am not prepared at this time to make definite recom-
mendations as to how the function of Radiological Safety should be
integrated into the Task Force operation, I am convinced that there is
5