objectives, with one exception: the objective of Project 3.2 was reduced from true crater measurement to apparent crater measurement, because the probability of meaningful data did not justify the support effort requircd. An additional project was approved at this time: Project 3.4, Minefield Clearance, under Navy sponsorship. The possibility of expanding the objective of Project 1.4 to include underwater pressiureversus-time measurements from a surface burst over deep water was explored. Althoug) LASL agreed to relocation of one of the barge shots to a position outside of the !agoon, with certain restrictions, the estimated yields of the devices then scheduled were tou high to make a satisfactory test probable. In view of this and the additional support iavolved, the matter was dropped. During the operational phase, the following projects were edded to the military-effect test program: Project 2.7 (Study of Radiation Fallout by Oceanographic Methods) was added to obtain Commander Joint Tosk Force 7 Other Task Groups —I— Commander Task Group 7.4 » Chief i: Otner Task Units Task Commdnder Unit 13 lo Fleld Command, AFSwP Oirectorate Weapons Effects Teets Projects Figure 1.1 Organizational relationships. additional fallout data by employment of water sampling and other techniques in free- ocean areas. Project 3.5 (Blast Effects on Miscellaneous Structures) was added to document the damage to shore facilities arising from the unexpectedly high yield of Shot 1. Project 4.1 (Study of Response of Human Beings Accidentally Exposed to Radiation Due to Fallout from High Yield Weapons) was added to document, incidental to medical treatment, observations of personnel evacuated from those atolls east of Bikini unex- pectedly contaminated by fallout from Shot 1. The physical damage and adverse radiological situation arising from Shot 1, coupled with repeated postponements of subsequent events because of weather, placed the militaryeffect participation in subsequent shots on a tentative basis. In particular, the adverse effects of the following factors were very real: (1) gradua! loss of personnel as their total accumulative radiation dosage exceeded the maximum limit because of radiological contamination of Bikini Atoll land areas to which entry was mandatory for project purposes; (2) loss of equipment by Projects 2.2 and 2.5 by a secondary fire from Shot 1 on the Tare Island support facility; (3) conversion from land-based to ship-based operations at Bikini after Shot 1, with attendant difficulties of personnel transport, communications, 16