more, Travis AFB, Cape Canaveral, and San Diego, to name a few. Table 3.1 lists the key personnel of TG 7.1. 3.3 PLANNING AND TRAINING Programs, Schedules, and Concepts. Planning for Operation Hardtack essentially started during Operation Redwing as ideas for improvement of operations were generated by the participants in the test area. These ideas, for example, invoived the use of Taongi to offset delays caused by weather and fallout problems, and use of separate atolls by the two weapon labora- tories to improve the continuity of effort and reduce the excessive commuting between Bikini and Eniwetok. By the fall of 1956, the DOD had decided on five shots it planned to sponsor and on the major effects projects it proposed to carry out on Hard- tack, At the end of January 1957, the Eniwetok Planning Board considered those 5 shots plus 12 sponsored by LASL and 14 by UCRL as the total pro- gram for the 1958 EPG operation. By June of 1957, the general concept of the operation had been evolved and was published for planning guidance, list- ing a total of 27 shots. This initial shot schedule was revised three times before publication of the Task Group's Operation Plan in January 1958 and, prior to the first detonation of Hardtack, two more changes to the shot schedule were issued. During the entire period 10 revised shot schedules were published, listing the latest available information on ready dates and expected yields, with pertinent remarks as to zero locations and shielding for the different devices and weapons. Detailed planning for diagnostic and effects programs was, of course, slowed down as a consequence of the constantly changing shot schedule. It was further complicated by the competition for the experimenter's time when he was deeply involved in the Plumbbob operation in Nevada. Late decisions on whether or not to use Taongi, and on establishing the starting date for the operation as either April 1 or May 1 also served to hinder planning. By the start of the operation, however, there had evolved the following more important concepts affecting operational planning and determination of requirements: 1. Both Bikini and Eniwetok Atolls would be used as shot sites for megaton as well as smaller yield shots. UCRL would conduct its tests on Bikini, while LASL would operate on Eniwetok ~ each independent of the other. D 2. The DOD high altitude missile shots would be launched from Bikini Island, and the high altitude balloon shot would be fired from the USS Boxer between the two atolls. The two underwater shots would be detonated in the vicinity of the southern islands of Eniwetok. 3. General evacuation of Bikini Atoll would take place for four gala shots, the UCRL Sycamore and Poplar devices, and the two high altitude missile weapons. 4. <A capability of conducting limited operations afloat while Bikini was TE ED evacuated would be maintained, as would an emergency evacuation capability for both atolls. Two major changes in these concepts occurred after the operational phase started. Most drastic was the decision to transfer the Redstone missile shots to Johnston Island itn order to reduce the flash blindness problem. Later in the operation it also became necessary to transfer some of the 63 AFWU/HO oz