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Secretary Quarles replied that Secretary Dulles' suggestion gave rise to complicated questions, and that the problem of
forces for limited war was far from achieving agreement as to the
implications. The Defense Department had thought it best for the
Joint Chiefs of Staff to formulate a plan for the study of the
problem and to submit this plan to the National Security Council
through the NSC Planning Board, where the State Department member
and other members of the Planning Board would have an opportunity
to analyze and comment upon the JCS plan. Would such a procedure
meet the point raised by Secretary Dulles? As to the other matter
raised by the Secretary of State--namely, the time of submission
of the JCS plan (March 15, 1958)--it was the view of the Defense
Department that the probiem of forces for limited war was so difficult and serious that consideration of the plan deserved the amount
of time allocated. Perhaps the due date of the JCS plan could be
advanced if the President so desired. Secretary Quarles then asked
if General Twining could present his views on this general subject.
:
General Twining pointed out that the Joint Chiefs of Staff
had been concerned for a very long time with the problem of U. S&S.
forces for limited military operations. Indeed, our basic national
security policy called upon the Defense Department to maintain such
forces.
It was true that we did not have a "platoon system" of
forces set apart for the specific purpose of undertaking limited
military operations. Such a separate force might be very desirable,
but it would surely be very expensive, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff
were now stretched to the absolute budgetary limit. In spite of
this, we were capable of sending military forces today from the
pool of regular military forces to any part of the world where they
were needed, and to do this very rapidly.
With respect to the proposed study by the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, General Twining pointed out that in the wake of the leak of
the Gaither Report the Joint Chiefs of Staff were very worried about
& possible leak of our U. S. war plans. If outsiders like those on
the Gaither Panel were brought into the JCS study, a leak of our war
plans might actually prove fatal to our national security.
Secretary Dulles quickly pointed out that he was not suggesting that any persons outside of the Government be brought in on
the formulation of the Defense Department study. He was only asking
for the inclusion of State Department views on the problem of forces
for limited war from the outset of the study. If these State Department views were not included, the result would be purely a military study of the problem, and we would have to go on to do another
study of the problem of limited war in its political and foreign
policy aspects.
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