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Secretary Dulles then commented that HammarskjJld had just
come back from the Near East with a thesis for settling Arab-Israeli
hostility which Secretary Dulles said he would like very much to be
able to believe in, but found it hard to do so.
Hammarskj$ld argues
that if we can bring about a union of the Arab states and end the
insecurity in which the Arabs continually feel they live, then a
mood of confidence would arise and the problem of Israel would be-
|
come a secondary matter of a mere boundary dispute rather than 4
primary matter--that is, a threat to the security of the Arab na' tions. Secretary Dulles repeated that he found it extremely hard
to accept the validity of Hammarskj§1d's reasoning. If, indeed,
the Arab nations did achieve unity, would the consequences be those
suggested by Hammarskj$1d?
Or, on the contrary, would a wiited Arab
state feel itself strong and secure enough to destroy Israel? Moreover, @ unification of the Arab states might make Western Europe's
situation with respect to oil even more serious than it now was. If
the policy on the supply of oil from the Arab states to Western En‘rope were madeuniformasaresult_of
oftl
thetunification. ofthe Arab __.
‘from the Near East would become critical.
There were thus dangers
in Hammarskjéld's thesis, though he is continuing to work on it.
Secretary Dulles went on to point out that one cannot always predict Soviet actions. It would appear that the Soviets have
a free and open field in the Near East into which they could rush;
but in point of fact, they have not moved in on the Near East as
rapidly as they are capable of. They joined in the foundation of
Israel and for a considerable time thereafter the Soviets backed
the Israelis. Then they modified their policy and assumed a neutral
position between Israel and the Arab states. Then, three or four
years ago, they changed agein, and adopted an out-and-out pro-Arab
position. In brief, the situation in the Near East was too uncertain
to permit us to say that we are doomed. because at this time we cannot
perceive a clear-cut and immediate course of action to settle this
great problem of Arab-Israeli hostilities.
General Cutler explained the Planning Board's view of Arab
unity, pointing out that the Plenning Board recommendation would apply to unification only of the Arab states within the Arab peninsula.
The Planning Board felt that if we could achieve such a unification,
the interests of the United States would be better served if and when
the present pro-Western Areb regimes fell. Secretary Dulles replied
that he was not saying that the State Department opposed moves in the
direction of Arab unity; but the State Department wanted to be very
careful that we did not end up by uniting the Arab states against the
United States and the West.
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