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"State Proposal
"Defense-ODM-JCS Proposal
"30,
"30.+ As a matter of priority,
Constantly explore
the prospects and possibilities of an effort by the
United States directly, or
by a third party inspired or
encouraged by the United States,
to persuade the Arab states and
Israel to work toward a settlement along the lines of the Secretary of State's speech of Aug-
take action toward achieving an
early resolution of the ArabIsraeli dispute. To this end develop proposals, for submission
by the United States directly or
through the UN or through a third
party, under which the parties to
the dispute can work toward a
peaceful and equitable settlement
of their differences."
ust 26, 1955."
The President inquired, with respect to the State proposal,
whether the subparagraphs of paragraph 30, which outlined the specific
‘terms of a proposal to resolve the Arab-Israeli dispute, were in gen-
‘eral consonant with the settlement proposed by the speech of the Sec-
retary of State on August 26, 1955.
General Cutler replied in the af-
firmative, and then explained why the Joint Chiefs of Staff favored
the left-hand version of the introduction to paragraph 30, and why
the State Department felt that its proposal was more realistic...
The President agreed that the version on the left-hand side
was certainly more affirmative in tone, but he expressed the opinion
that if the subparagraphs of paragraph 30 were acceptable, as they appeared to be, to both sides, he would prefer the State version rather
than the Defense-JCS proposal, because the State version provided the
greater flexibility in any attempt to resolve the Arab-Israeli dispute.
' General Cutler then called on General Twining to express any
further views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Twining replied
that he had nothing to add to the written views of the Joint Chiefs in
favor of the version of paragraph 30 on the left-hand side. General
Cutler then called on Secretary Quarles.
Secretary Quarles said he must admit that in paragraph 30
the Defense Department appeared to be meddling in the affairs of the
State Department. Nevertheless, the Defense Department felt that it
was so urgent to settle the Arab-Israeli dispute that a strong initiative by the United States was required. Our national policy on the
Near East should be shaped by the concept that this was an area where
World War III could very well commence. Moreover, our military authorities cannot guarantee to hold military actions in the Near East
to small limited operations once war began. If everyone is prepared
to accept this general concept, Defense would agree to the version
of paragraph 30 favored by the Department of State.
Secretary Dulles asked if he might speak to the general
problem of Arab-Israeli tensions. Certain considerations on this
subject were of such a nature that they were not presented to the
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