would involve a sizeable number of inhabitants (154) and would entail some degree of hazard and hardship and (c) since such action would not go un- noticed in worldwide discussions of nuclear weapons testing there should be an impelling safety reason to require evacuation. Recognizing the validity of these arguments, the counterarguments were: (a) there were ships capable of removing the inhabitants from Utirik by the third day after shot day (b) it might be possible to save them 45 roentgens of exposure by doing so and (c) the major decision, in terms of public relations, had already been made when the first Rongelapese and Ailinginaese were evacuated. ° A decision was reachedand evacuation of the 154 inhabitants of Utirik was started at about H + 55 hours and completed on H + 78 hours, They were also transported to Kwajalein where they were given the same care as those from Rongelap and Ailinginae and were returned to their home island of Utirik on June 5, 1954.” In a retelling of this story more than a decade later the situation may appear so clear that the decisions should not have been difficult. However, like any emergency situation there are always uncertainties in the immediately available information, This was especially so since the initial radiation DOE ARCHIVES *Twenty-eight members of the Task Group conducting the nuclear tests were evacuated from Rongerik Island at H + 28.5 and H+ 34 hours. Their total external gamma dose was estimated to be 78 rads.~ It was later reported by the Japanese that some fishermen aboard a vessel near the Pacific Proving Ground may have received higher exposures than the Marshallese.>°