from the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory with whom the censorship program has been informally discussed have indicated that as far as is known none of the "letter-writers" at the IVY Opera- tion were employed by the Commission or its contractors and that personnel of the Commission and its contractors are entrusted with equally sensitive information at the laboratories in the United States without their personal communications being subjected to censorship. Additionally, personnel have specifically commented that these scientific "it 1s becoming very difficult to obtain scientific workers for test activities, Without these workers in good supply, one can only expect a substantial delay in the nuclear weapons program, Many workers are away from their families for six months of the year and they are becoming restive. Every effort should be made to minimize irritations which tend to drive workers out of the program, " 9. It is believed that benefits derived from a mail censorship program can be attained from an intensified security education program, As observed previously, censorship of per- sonal communications was not in effect at Operation SANDSTONE in 1948 or Operation GREENHOUSE in 1951. All personnel involved in these operations were instructed to practice self-censorship and were given specific instructions in tne matter of what could be related in personal communications. We are not aware of any violations at these tests similar to the letter-writing incidents at Operation IVY. It appears that during Operation IVY the regulations of the commander of the Task Force, while adequate, were not implemented by the Task Groups in a manner which would insure that all personnel were aware of their specific security responsibilities. In some instances, however, -7- the Appendix "a"