ie, the test activities following the return of Task Force personn from the Proving Grounds. Censorship, in addition, would not prevent the press from speculating on activities of the Task Force at the Proving Grounds, To be completely effective a ma censorship program would have to be supplemented with voluntar press censorship which could be established only with great difficulty if 1t could be established at all. 4, There has been no censorship of personal mail for personnel of the Department of Defense since the end of host1ll in World War II even for troops on front line duty in Korea. emphasizes the possibility that a personal mail censorship program could raise serious morale problems. ¥ 5. It is believed that benefits derived from a mail censorship program can be attained from an intensified securit education program, The Commander, Joint Task Force Seven in ¢ letter dated March 24, 1953, to the Chief of Staff, United St« Army, a copy of which was circulated as AEC 597/12, noted the many problems involved in a mail censorship program and recommended that ". . . The policy of self-censorship of pers mail be continued without recourse to official censorship back up by intensified security indoctrination and security educati and examination programs." The Commander of Joint Task Force Seven has since forwarded to the Division of Security his progr security regulations which require individual instructton and examination of each member of the Task Force by unit commande: to assure that such personnel have specific understanding of their security responsibilities and are specifically ins3tructe as to what information may be included in personal corresponde - 2-