ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION CENSORSHIP AT FORTHCOMING OPERATION Report by the Director of Security THE PROBLEM 1. To consider whether censorship of personal communications shall be required at forthcoming operations at the Pacific Proving Grounds. SUMMARY 2. During the testing operations conducted at the Pacific Proving Grounds in the fall of 1952 a number of “eye-witness accounts" appeared in the press throughout the country indicating that an atomic weapon test of considerable magnitude had occurred, Considerable criticism of the Atomic Energy Commission and of Joint Task Force 132 appeared in the press as a result of these disclosures with specific criticism being made that personal mail should have been censored, The security plan for Operation Ivy, following a pattern established at the preceding Pacific Proving Grounds tests, contained a provision that there was to be no censorship of personal mail. Personnel of the Task Force, however, were cautioned to exercise self-censorship, 3. A personal mail censorship program for the forthcoming operation could serve to delay the communication of classified information concerning the tests for a limited time. on the other hand, Censorship, cannot of itself safeguard information concerning