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Four,
The continuance of the present rate of H-bombtesting --
;
by the most sober and responsible scientific judgment -- does not imperil
the health of humanity. On the amountof radio-active fall-out,
including Strontium 90, resulting from tests, the most authoritative
judgment is that of the independent National Academy of Sciences.
It reported last June, following a study by 150 scientists of the
first rank, that the radiation exposure from all weapons-tests
to date -- and from continuing testa at the same rate -- is, and
would be, only a small fraction of the exposure that individuals
receive from natural sources and from medical X-rays during their
lives,
Five, On the other hand, the continuance of this testing is
having two important beneficial results.
{A) The most recent tests enable us to harness and discipline
our weapons more precisely and effectively -- drastica lly reducing
their fall-out and making them more easy to concentrate, if ever rN,
ee
(B) And these same recent tests have helpedc us to develop -not primarily weapons for vaster destruction -- but weapons for
defense of our people against any possible enemy attack, as wel}
as knowledge vital to our whole program of civil defense.
Six.
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There is radio-active fali-out, including Strontium 90,
fromthe testing of all nuclear weapons, of whatever size, But the
character of the weapon, as well ag its size, determines the fall-out.
Such fall-out cannot be avoided -- as has been implied -- by limiting
tests to the smaller nuclear weapons. Such fall-out of Strontium 90
as does take place results from the process of atomic fission,
Fission is the basic phenomenon of the smaller weapons. Thus,
the idea that we can "stop sending this dangerous material into
the air" -- by concentrating upon small fission weapons -~- is based
REPRODUCED AT THE DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER LIBRARY
upon apparent unawareness of the facta,
Seven, With reference to the Soviet Union: its sympathy with
the idea of stopping H-bomb teste ig indisputable, This idea merely
reflects the Soviet Union's repeated insistence, ever since discussion
of the Baruch Plan in 1946, that all plans for disarmament be based
on simple voluntary agreements, Now, as always, this formula
allows for no safeguards, no control, no inspection,
Eight, A simple agreement to stop H-bombtests cannot be
regarded as automatically self-enforcing on the unverified assumption
that such tests can instantly and surely be detected. It is true that
tests of very large weapons would probably be detected whm they
Occur, We believe that we have detected practically all such tests
to date. It is, however, impossible -- in view of the vast Soviet
land-mass that can screen possible future tests -- to have positive
assurance of such detection, except in the case of the largest weapons,
No r is it possible to state, immediately following the long-range
detection of a test, its size and character,
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