-SEGRET
-4-
program.
The report was sent to the Secretary of Defense on
March 18, 1958.
7.
AICBM
A panel of the PSAC under the chairmanship of Dr. Wiesner was
established in January of 1958 to study the problems of ballistic missile
defense. Its first general report recommended that a single office be
given responsibility for over-all planning and direction of the AICBM
development. It outlined the research tasks along the road to AICBM
development pointing out ite extremely difficult nature and the great
uncertainties involved. In a report of May 12, 1958, to the Special
Mo.
Assistant, the Panel discussed the Nike-Zeus schedule, funding, and
mT
planned deployment. It also was concerned with the effects of high
5
i
%
altitude nuclear detonations on AJCBM systems. It pointed out the
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Ya3
decoy problem. Ina preliminary report of 10 February 1959, the
Panel emphasized the value of passive defense, i.e. dispersal, hardening, concealment, and quick reaction, as more certainly effective and
inexpensive than active defenses in the time period prior to 1965.
The
Panel met again on April 25, 1959, and is preparing an assessment of
the Nike- Zeus system and the problem of decoye. The AICBM Fanel
consists of 10 members and, in addition, utilized the services of some
seven consultants.
8.
Early Warning
An Early Warning Panel of the FSAC under the chairmanship of
Dr. Wiesner submitted a report on March 13, 1959, which made a
number of significant recommendations regarding the acceleration of a
ballistic missile early warning capability (BMEWS).
Portion deleted, per NSF litters of 3/10/76 and 4/8/76
« The Panel consists of six members
and five consultants. The report of the Early Warning Panel was transmitted to the Secretary of Defense on March 23, 1959.
9.
Response to Early Warning
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An Ad Hoc Panel on Response to Early Warning under the chairman-
ship of Dr. Wiesner met on April 18, 1959, to consider early warning
mechanisms and response to warning. It also covered the scientific
and technical aspects of strategic warning. Its report is now in
preparation. The group concluded that there was an important need for
national policy on utilization of warning in the missile era and for a
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