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information for a military program. It noted that a prohibition of all
nationally conducted large missile tests would not prevent USSR from
building an operational missile force if the USSR had already developed
ICBM capability at the time of the agreement.
Portions deleted,
per Defense letter of 3/25/75
and NSF letters of 3/10/76 and 1/8/76
28. Surprise Attack
On June 3, 1958, the Secretary of State, in a letter to the Special
Assistant, requested the PSAC to explore ina preliminary way some
of the general facets of the surprise attack problem, with particular
reference to its scientific and technical aspects.
On July 10, 1958, the
Chairman replied to the Secretary giving him the results of a two-day
preliminary discussion of the subject by a group of the PSAC members.
The report emphasized that a discussion of surprise attack involves
many elements and that it cannot be studied in a limited technical manner.
On July 14, 1958, the President sent a memorandum to the Secretary of
State suggesting that he join with the Secretary of Defense and Dr. Killian
in having a careful study made to further our preparations for possible
negotiations on measures to detect and discourage surprise attack. He
directed that the study be made after consulting with other government
agencies and officials. An interagency group under the chairmanship of
Dr. Kistiakowsky was brought together, rendering its report on
August 15, 1958. In parallel with the work of the interagency group, a
special panel of the FSAC, under the chairmanship of Dr. Zacharias
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