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The first revision in our military support concept which General
Clarkson considers logical is the basing of the Air Task Group at Kwajadein. Our original intention of basing that group at Eniwetok certainly
was in consonance with the old idea of shooting several shots at Eniwetok
and only one or two at Bikini.
But now that Bikini is the center of acti-
vity for most of the operation it doesn't matter, from an operational
standpoint, where the Air Task Group is based.
|However, from a money
standpoint, it will be much cheaper to base the group at Kwajalein.| This
concept should appeal to the AEC since the Eniwetok Rehabilitation Project
would be substantially reduced in scope, and General Clarkson contemplates
use of Task Force funds to make Kwajalein suitable for re-use. In
°
considering the return to Kwajalein, we studied all the operational inplications such as sampling, staging the samplers through Eniwetok on
the last shot, communications, distances and control, and we are convinced
that no new problems would be involved. Consequently, unless you have
cogent reasons to the contrary, we intend to coordinate this revision in
concept with the AEC, CINCPAC, Kwajalein and CIG 7.4.
There is a second important problem that needs more thinking in
light of our new shot concept. In considering the fact that Bikini now
becomes the principal area of activity, it can be easily deduced that
where the shot sites are located, that is where the bulk of your
scientific personnel will always want to be; where key scientific and 7.1
operations people are located, that is where the support and lift problems
will lie; where the support problems lie, that is where the Task Force
Commander and his operational people ought to be. No matter what is done
to curtail it, everyone will either have or create a need to be at
Bikini. Once at Bikini, those people living afloat will either have or
create a need to be ashore to get their jobs done. This, I think, is a
realistic picture of what will probably take place, despite many written
words to the contrary.
If this is reasonably true, what would your
attitude be to an idea substantially as follows?
1.
Establish a rudimentary tent camp at Enyu Island for not
more that 500 tenants and perhaps 150 overhead personnel.
are probably high).
these lines:
(These figures
The 500 tenants to be broken down somewhere along
350 for principal people of 7.1 and 7.5, and 150 total for
~worw- +
Task Force and military task group headquarters personnel.
2. Mobile facilities to provide camp utilities, and messing
under field conditions. Camp to be evacuated for less than a 24-hour
period on the 3d, 4th and 5th shots, by all except firing party bunker
personnel. ‘This temporary setup might well serve as a base camp site for
a subsequent operation.
3. If you contemplate detonating all the Bikini devices
remotely from the AGC, and Enyu will not serve any major purpose, how
about extending the Eniman Island camp to accommodate all except those
key personnel who will be aboard the AGC with you and General Clarkson?
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