8 A second alternative program would be for one high yield shot underground at the NTS on the order of about 40 kt. Such a detonation while possible within a few weeks jeopardize the remainder of the tunnel complex in which it would be fired and therefore an additional 4 to 5 weeks should be taken to assure that the device can be fired without jeopardizing the remainder of the complex. Furthermore the considerations for atmospheric testing are covered including some details on the number of balloons required, the availability of devices and which ones are candidates for early detonation by this method and the various types and areas in which atmospheric testing might be undertaken either by balloon or air drop or at the NTS or Eniwetok. The readiness and response time for atmospheric testing at the NTS is certainly short on the order of weeks but should larger yield devices be desired these could be accomplished by an air drop at sea or at Eniwetok and it is felt that about 3 months time is the minimum response that could be met for these locatiors. It should be noted that the stress in this study from the General Manager is that every effort be made to avoid the alternate quick response programs which would cause problems in the long run and that the short range program already planned be implemented to permit maximum use of the available facilities and secure adequate diagnostic information. It is clear from a letter dated 5 September from Chairman Seaborg to Mr. McGeorge Bundy that the alternative approaches to resuming testing addressed and discussed by the AEC General Manager came out of Seaborg's discussions with the President and Secretary McNamara a few days previous. Clearly, McNamara was asking for a quick response to match the Russians and he had said specifically what could the AEC do to provide 3 shots on a "two-weeks, tour-weeks, six-weeks schedule''. Secondly, because these shots might not be noted other than by the fact that we would announce them, it was further requested that a schedule for a high enough yield shot that would clearly be felt and noted off-site and by foreign observers be detailed also. In his response to Bundy,Seaborg reiterates the disadvantages of the alternative programs for three quick’ shots and for the soonest possible high yield shot and even adds a couple other disadvantages. Cne other disadvantage that he notes is "the Soviets have tried hard to picture us to the world as having made continuous preparations for testing and to be ready to start at the very first opportunity. They surely would take advantage,;of any announcement by us of an almost immediate test detonation to furtherAline." In brief, Seaborg concludes by recommending to Bundy that if a test program is to be undertaken, it be the short range program that has been set forth and discussed and prepared for since July. It is noted further that a decision must be made on this very day, September 5th, to meet a first detonation schedule of September 14th. A 7 September TWX from Betts to the Labs asks them to answer specific questions concerning the advantages and disadvantages of testing in the atmosphere and requests the replies by 11 September so that a joint AEC/DoD position can be prepared for submission to the President in the near future. DMA and in particular a Lt. Col. McMillan are now on about the 6th of September actively investigating the rights and facilities and supplies that AEC has at EPG.