b. Message No, 2: From Weather Detachment, Rongerik, to JIF
SEVEN, 2015, 1 March - "For JIF SEVEN Eniwetok, Pass to Mr Breslin.
Auto monitor present reading is 100 plus repeat present reading is 100
plus, pen off chart and has been in this position since 02502. Request
acknowledgement of receipt from Breslin, Signed Commander."

Above message was received 2040 (local time) by AACS,

Eniwetok and delivered to Army Communications Center, Eniwetok: for
further transmission to JIF SEVEN at 2050.

Major Fellie F. Robinson,

Weather Reporting Element, Task Group 7.4 was read the message by the

AACS at 2049 (local time).

The message was discussed with Colonel M, B.

Hammond, Commander Test Services Unit, TG 7.4.

It was decided to obtain

more information before any action should be taken.

An attempt was made

to locate Mr Breslin of the NYOO, AEC, on Parry Island to determine the
meaning of "100 plus", He was not on the island but Colonel Dave Miller

TG 7,1 stated that the top range of the instrument was 100 mr/hr.

It

was then decided to call on other Task Group personnel to assist in
evaluating the problem and determine the correct course of action, However, it was considered advisable to send message No, 3 to Rongerik as a

precautionary masure - "From Weather Reporting Element, to Rongerik, 0015
2 March 1954: 'Cease all operations immediately and all personnel remain
inside mtal buildings until further notice. Maintain rotating shift

radio communications with one DR for further instructions. Robinson sends, '"

c, At approximately 2300 Colonel K, H. Houghton, Technical
Advisor, TG 7.4, was called by Lt Colonel Watkins and requested that he
attend a meting to consider the radiation conditions at Rongerik. At
avproximately 2330 a meeting was held at Lt Colonel Hammond's quarters,

In attendance were Lt Colonel Hammond, Colonel Houghton, Lt Colonel James
Watkins (Commander, Test Aircraft Unit), Major Robinson and Captain

Chrestensen, Rad-Safe Officer, Test Support Unit, TG 7.4. Responsibilitis
for the down cloud area monitoring and the Rad~Safe instrumentation available at Rongerik was discussed. It was determined that Task Group 7.4
should take steps to determine for themselves what the true radiological
situation was at Rongerik and not wait for JTF SEVEN notification,

It

was deemed undesirable to attempt to get a water landing aircraft into

Rongerik before daylight (approximately O700M, 2 March 1954).

If a PBM

or SA-16 aircraft were sent direct to Rongerik from Eniwetok an advantage

of only 1$ hours would be gained over utilizing the regular Kwajalein-

Rongerik resupply run that was scheduled for 0800 M on the morning of
2 March,

A MATS aircraft was leaving at 0300M on 2 March for Kwajalein

from Eniwetok and it was decided to send Captain Chrestenson as a radmonitor on that aircraft and have him pick up the regular Rongerik run

at that station,

d,

Captain Chrestensen departed Kwajalein by Navy SA-16 at 0830,

2 March and arrived over Rongerik at 0945,

The aircraft did not land

immediately but made passes over the island at 500 ft altitude,

The

declassified

OD orp 5200.19
Declassified

APIyo

DOD DIR 5200.

Select target paragraph3